[EM] Range-Approval hybrid

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Chris Benham wrote:
> I  have an idea for a  FBC complying method  that  I think is clearly
> better  than the version of   "Range Voting" (aka  Average Rating or
> Cardinal Ratings)  defined and promoted by  CRV.
> 
>   http://rangevoting.org/
>  
> I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom
> slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing
> "disapproval" and all others as expressing "Approval".  The default
> rating is the bottom-most.
>  
> Compute each candidate X's  Approval score and also "Approval
> Opposition" score  (the approval score of the most approved candidate
> on ballots that don't approve X).
>  
> All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval
> opposition (AO) score are disqualified.  Elect the undisqualified
> candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating.
>  
> I suggest many fewer slots than 99  and no  "no opinion" option, so I
> think the resulting method is not more complex for voters.

One way of making it less complex would be to have a cardinal ratings 
(Range) ballot with both positive and negative integers. The voter rates 
every candidate, and those candidates that get below zero points are 
considered disapproved, while those that get above zero are considered 
approved. This idea doesn't specify where those rated at zero (or those 
not rated at all) would appear.

Normalization could be used if required, with either the voter 
specifying "absolutely worst" and "absolutely best" (setting the range), 
or by the lowest and highest rated candidate having those positions. So 
if a voter wants to say that he likes all the candidates, but some are 
better than others, he could vote all positive integers, whereas a 
McCain/Obama/Clinton voter could vote McCain less than zero and the 
other two greater than zero. With normalization, the contribution of

A: 1 pts.
B: -1 pts.

to the raw scores would be the same as

A: 3 pts.
B: 1 pt.

but would have a different effect regarding the approval component (only 
A approved in the first case, both approved in the second).