[EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent

[Raph Frank]

On 9/24/08, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:
> True, the translation barrier (from open to secret ballots) is another
>  protection.  It's partial.  On its own, it cannot protect an open vote
>  from purchase for its signalling value (like a paid endorsement, or a
>  meeting stuffed with a paid audience).  And it cannot protect norms,
>  which are acted on by a different pathway.  The fallback defence for
>  these is recasting.

Right, it is like currently, where control of the nomination process
is powerful, even if it doesn't control the voters.

> You are thinking of using approval/range voting to provide an
>  indicator of compromise *paths*?  Interesting.  It might be useful,
>  especially for norms.  Knowing that 2 candidate norms A and B *shared*
>  assent (many approving of both) would reveal an opportunity to create
>  a variant C that somehow combined the content of A and B.  Assent
>  might then shift to C.  (It need not be a "compromise" document,
>  technically speaking.  If A and B are mutually compatible, then C
>  might be purely an aggregate.)

True.

Also, lower level clients could approve multiple proxies.  The end
result might be that to many proposals are approved.

>  It might be less useful for official elections, like for executives.
>  The only way to "combine" executive candidates A and B would be for
>  them to vote for each other as a team.  Usually a team cannot occupy a
>  single office.  They occupy a power structure, usually with a clear
>  chain of command.

Well, candidate C might be the compromise.