[EM] language/framing quibble

[Raph Frank]

On 9/17/08, Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke at verizon.net> wrote:
> Good Afternoon, Raph
>
>  re: "However, under your system, they (minority views) do get
>      represented in the "level 1" triads.  What they lose is the
>      having high level representatives."
>
>  Ahhhhh.  Now we're at the crux of the matter ...
>
>  Whether or not a minority view retains high level representatives depends
> on how well the holder of the minority view is able to persuade others of
> the validity and desirability of the minority view.  The system guarantees
> that each and every view will have an audience, but nothing, absolutely
> nothing, can make that view worthy of representation except compelling
> advocacy.

My concern would be that their opinions would be dismissed out of
hand.  If there is nobody pushing them at a national level, then that
is an almost instinctive reaction to weird ideas (including 'good'
weird ideas).

>  re: "However, since your proposal is for a council rather than
>      the Parliament, then this is not as much an issue."
>
>  The proposal I posted was drafted for a specific Council.  The concept is
> equally appropriate for selecting representatives for any legislature.

Well, would be worth seeing if it works at the council level first.

>  re: "The worst case is that all except a minority view gets
>      removed."
>
>  Can you explain how that could occur?

Ahh, I did with the religious minority?

>  That's subjective.  The math is neither objective nor reasonable.

The question comes down to how well the "Veto anyone else being promoted" works.

It seems to me that each person has at least 1/3 chance of getting
through.  If someone uses a "See if I can get through without telling
anyone my plan, and if not then I veto", then at least 1/3 of the
people who do that should end up being promoted.

The chance of a person being nominated is

(1/3)*(general chance of being vetoed)

Assuming the above, and ignoring the (general chance) as it cancels.

A 25% minority is in 58 triads.

19 go through
39 veto
42 go through from rest of triads

They now have 31% of the representatives.  This isn't the increase in
my previous version, but is still an increase.

Using Matab, there doesn't seem to be a lower limit before the strategy fails.

However, 1% of the population would require 105 rounds to be > 99% of
the remaining popoulation, so in practice there is a minimum size the
minority needs to be.

Rounds need to be > 99.99%)  Fraction of the population

 13) 0.1041
 12) 0.1152
 11) 0.1289
 10) 0.1459
  9) 0.1679
  8) 0.1969
  7) 0.2368
  6) 0.2940
  5) 0.3803
  4) 0.5163
  3) 0.7232
  2) 0.9390
  1) 0.9993
  0) 1.0000

A 29.4% minority would take 6 rounds to be virtually 100% and 2 rounds
to have a majority.

A 10.41% minority would take 10 rounds to be virtually 100% and 6
rounds to have a majority.

>  The argument based on the concept of a 'veto' is invalid.  In a triad, it
> takes two to make a selection.  If a zealot refuses to agree to a selection
> (i.e., 'vetoes' it) the triad will be unable to make a selection (I cannot
> believe rational people will vote for a zealot who refuses to participate).
> If there is no selection the bigot cannot advance.

He says nothing about his veto plan, and then at the end if he can't
get through he vetoes.

Would people see through him?

>  Triads are made up of human beings intent on finding the best of their
> number to act as their representatives.  To suggest they will select bigots
> is preposterous.  The reality is that bigots, religious or otherwise, will
> be the first eliminated, for there is nothing more offensive to humans than
> zealotry they don't share.

It depends on how well the zealot hides it.  In practice, this might
be hard for him.

Also, one guy could say "Do you vote for X (the 3rd guy) to go
through?", and if he answers Yes, then say "OK, I vote for you then".

It would depend on how the voting works.  For example, you could set
it up so that each person submits a secret ballot.  If 2 of the 3
agree on the other person, then that person can accept.

Another option would be that each person has to sign the nomination
paper to make it final.  They could ask the suspected zealot to sign
each of their papers first and if he signs, then they assume that he
isn't a zealot and instead, the other 2 people sign his form.  Ofc,
they could stab him in the back at that point too.

>  Perhaps the most misleading point in the foregoing citation is the failure
> to recognize that we're talking about real, breathing human beings; people
> of intellect and judgment; the kind of people we interact with, every day of
> our lives.  We may not agree with all of their views, but we must
> acknowledge that they are capable of reason.

One defense would be to discriminate against a minority.  You could
assume that a person from a religious group was going to be a zealot.

>  If not, homo sapiens isn't very sapient.

Reason is both the problem and solution here.  Reason sets up the
system and reason tries to find ways to abuse it.

>  re: "One possible solution to this would be to have the six
>      people meet and then have one triad judge the other."
>
>  If the rationale I've presented opposing this notion is inadequate, the
> implementors may agree with you.

Might be worth having it as a backup.

>  re: "... there is the same problem is the population is not
>      divisible by 3."
>
>  That issue is addressed in the proposal:

Yeah, I know, but I was just responding to the suggestion that having
pairs of triads would cause a problem if there was an uneven number of
triads.  It seems the same solution could apply.

>  Failure to see this as a major issue is a serious concern.  The purpose of
> Practical Democracy is to give us an opportunity to evaluate the people who
> will represent us in our government.  We don't know these people, yet we are
> going to entrust them with our future.  It is imperative that we evaluate
> our choices.  We may not always get it right, but if we have the time and
> the exposure to them, we can do a lot better than we've been doing.

However, the increase from 2 to 3 people isn't a major increase.  If
people can handle 2, then they can handle 3.

>  re: "By voluntary I meant that the decisions of the final council
>      are only binding on those who participate."
>
>  I'm not confident I understand this.  First, though the petition was
> addressed to a Metropolitan Council, my discussion of it is as a method of
> selecting representatives to any legislature.  A legislature makes laws for
> all the people, not just for those who participate.

Right, I know that this is targetted at a binding organisation.  The
text of mine that you quoted in a previous message was related to a
system where participation was voluntary and the results had no
binding effects.

If the results are binding, then that creates an incentive to
participate which isn't present if the organisation has no binding
powers.

>  Re: "You may seem the numbers being picked drop like a rock as
>      the round number increases."
>
>  I don't understand this, at all.

Sorry about the typo., I meant
"You may *see* the numbers being picked drop like a rock as the round
number increases."

The point was that the number of triads that end up in a stalemate
would increase as the number of rounds pass.  Ofc, that means that the
next level would be made up more of compromisers, so maybe the effects
would cancel out.

>  re: "Well, he can say that if they don't pick him, then nobody is
>      being selected.  He has little ot lose by doing that."
>
>  All he can lose is his opportunity to advance.
>
>  I suspect level 1 will produce a few such idiots.  Fortunately, they will
> not advance to confound a higher level.  Unfortunately, the two people they
> are grouped with will be eliminated.  The only saving grace is that
> elections are a periodic process and those two people can not be placed in
> the same triad with that idiot in the next several elections.  Further
> analysis of this flaw in the process may reveal a better alternative.

What about rescrambling them.  Triads that fail to reach a consensus
are reformed.  Each round might consist of 2-3 sub-rounds.

Ofc, that creates an incentive to not agree to promote someone in
round 1-a and wait until round 1-c.  This is risky though.

It also means that the person promoted from the triad is more likely
to be similar to the other 2.  A 'left-wing' person is likely to
prefer to try again than promote a 'right-wing' candidate.

This may result in a more PR result.