[EM] language/framing quibble

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Sep 1 21:39:30 PDT 2008


On Mon, 1 Sep 2008 10:53:24 -0700 rob brown wrote:
 > On Mon, Sep 1, 2008 at 3:20 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
 > <km-elmet at broadpark.no <mailto:km-elmet at broadpark.no>>  wrote:
 >
 >     Consider Condorcet. One of the greater problems with plurality is
 >     vote-splitting, which favors minorities since it destroys a center
 >     that many think is good but only a few think is great. Thus,
 >     adopting Condorcet would help the majority, not minorities at the
 >     expense of the majority, ...
 >
I do not see Condorcet favoring minorities or majorities.

Condorcet does help voters express their desires.  Big example of this
is near twins getting nominated, mattering not whether they are
majority or minority.
       In Plurality voters approving their shared positions cannot vote
for both, so the two together likely get as many votes as either would
have received alone.
       In Condorcet such voters could vote for both, giving each their
deserved votes.

Another Condorcet advantage is the publishable array of voting
results.  This does not necessarily make minority candidates win, but
it can help minority positions get adopted.  If the ballot counts show
candidates backing position X tending to do better than their
opponents, more parties will consider backing this position.

DWK
 >
 > First, I think you are misusing the words "majority" and "minority" 
here
 > (as is common).  Personally I think they have no meaning unless there
 > are only two candidates (and there were never any other potential
 > candidates).
 >
 > I would argue that Condorcet (vs. plurality) helps "minorities", or
 > rather, people on the extremes.
 >
 > Say you have a dozen candidates, spread equally along the continuum 
from
 > "right" to "left".  A block of voters on the extreme left might, under
 > plurality, vote for an extreme left candidate.  Their votes are
 > effectively wasted.
 >
 > That same block of voters under Condorcet would likely change the
 > outcome in their favor....true, they wouldn?t elect an extreme left
 > candidate, but their votes may well cause a "more left" candidate 
to be
 > elected.  In other words, it will pull it in their direction by an
 > appropriate amount.
 >
 > Although real elections are not one dimensional like that*, I would
 > suggest that the the effect holds true.
 >
 > * (unless the vote happens to be for a number, such as a budget....in
 > which case selecting the median preferred value is roughly 
equivalent to
 > holding a Condorcet vote on an infinite number of "candidate values")
-- 
   davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
             Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                   If you want peace, work for justice.







More information about the Election-Methods mailing list