[EM] the 'who' and the 'what'

[Raph Frank]

On 9/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:
>  It seems this system would be more stable than I originally thought. Third
> parties could run as parts of the Condorcet party without running much of a
> risk, since they would otherwise get no votes at all. The defection danger
> surfaces when the third parties have become sufficiently large from using
> that parallel electoral system. Then a party that would win a plurality vote
> but who isn't a Condorcet winner has an incentive to defect.

If the condorcet party winner can realistically claim to be one of the
top-2, then it doesn't matter as he will defeat any challeger.  Both
the 2 main parties would have to defect.

The question is at what level of support does this becomes self-reinforcing.

>  Following that kind of reasoning, it would appear that conventional parties
> have very little to lose by running Condorcet primaries instead of Plurality
> primaries, more so if there's an open primary. (So why don't they?)

The current parties don't want to elect a condorcet winner, they want
to elect a winner that is biased towards them.

The 2 candidates in a 2 party system have to balance support of their
party with defeating the other candidate.

In the single issue case with voters ranging from 0 to 100, the 2
parties pick at 25 and 75, but the condorcet winner is at 50.

The final result might be 2 candidates at say 40 and 60 as they have
to balance the 2 requirements.  This can be seen as candidates switch
the focus of their campaign once they have won nomination.

Anyway, I would agree that an open primary would be key for the
condorcet party.  In states with a closed primary can a party allow
non-party members to vote if it wishes?  Would this block those voters
from voting in their 'real' party?

Another problem is actually getting the main candidates to
participate.  I assume it would be legal to add them to the ballot
without their permission?

Finally, turnout at the condorcet primary matters.  If only a small
number of people vote, then it is much less evidence that the winner
is the real condorcet winner.  One option would be to re-weight votes
so that the result is representative.

If the consequences of the result of the vote is not massive, then
there is little point in bothering to vote.  So, there needs to be
some kind of boot-strap.

Once the condorcet winner can credibilly claim to be one of the top-2,
then the condorcet primary almost becomes the final election.
Certainly, winning the condorcet primary would be a major boost to any
candidate.