[EM] Random and reproductible tie-breaks
Allen Smith
easmith at beatrice.rutgers.edu
Wed Sep 24 17:37:03 PDT 2008
In message <BAY104-F349E279E77D96E5BF3CE858F450 at phx.gbl> (on 24 September
2008 23:05:05 +0000), stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
(=?iso-8859-1?B?U3TpcGhhbmUgUm91aWxsb24=?=) wrote:
>for an anti-fraud purpose, the capacity to repeat the counting operation is
>a must. Hence I recommand to use a reproductible random procedure to break
>ties. This allows the use of different computers to reproduce the counting
>operation, while always obtaining the same result despite ties.
Cryptographically secure hashing methods would appear to be the appropriate
way to do this, using the ballots and/or some other agreed-upon information
(e.g., the year of the election in a specified coding, the names of the
candidates in a specified format...). I'm not sure whether it would be a
good idea to set it up such that the tie-breaking couldn't be computed
before the ballots came in (as would be possible if all the information
needed for it was known in advance).
-Allen
--
Allen Smith, Ph.D. http://cesario.rutgers.edu/easmith/
September 11, 2001 A Day That Shall Live In Infamy II
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." - Benjamin Franklin
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