[EM] (MA-2) Societal institution of communicative action

[Raph Frank]

On 9/25/08, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:
> Raph Frank wrote:
>  > It might also be worth discussing possible renormalisation of votes
>  > here to cancel out participation bias.  Also, it might be worth adding
>  > in actual participation bias in the final election.
>
>
> OK.

It also has the advantage that it encourages voters turnout in the
main election.

For example, if the last election was 4 years ago, then the turnout
estimate for the 22-25 age group might be determined (at least partly)
by the turnout for the 18-21 group in the last election (as they are 4
years older now).

> >
>  > Also, this protects against corruption of the system.  If voters vote
>  > due to intimidation or vote buying, then they can still vote the other
>  > direction in the final election.
>
>
> Like a safety valve.  Under pressure it doesn't break.  It fails
>  gracefully.

Right.

> You mean like gerrymandering?  Exploiting the voting patterns in the
>  open system?  I guess you're right, that's a vulnerablity.  It might
>  work in either direction too, for or against the open voters (equally
>  bad in either case).

Not necessarily.  For example, if the election system was plurality,
then winning at the open voting system gives the person a big boost,
as he becomes part of the top 2.

OTOH, if the election system was condorcet, then it would be less
important to win the open voting 'primary'.

Another possibility would be PR by single non-transferrable vote.
Again, this gives an advantage to groups who can coordinate outside
the system.

However, if that is a good or bad idea is open to question.

>  The medium of assent can never have a "final vote", of course.

Agreed.

>  > Have you considered the possibility of using encryption to allow
>  > anonymous participation <to encourage people to turnout)
>
> Or many of them will not bother to participate at all.  That's another
>  advantage to a secret ballot: higher turnout.

True, in fact, that is more likely to be the response.

> My design strategy (long term) is to allow all methods of
>  authentication.  Currently I have only the full disclosure (open cast)
>  method of authentication.  But if anyone wanted to design and code a
>  PK-encryption method, I think the architecture will be open to it.

And ofc, individual proxies could also handle use it to decide if they
want to do authentication that way.

>  So we can experiment with different methods of authentication and not
>  risk the overall credibility of the system.  Any particular method
>  that proved untrustworthy would simply be devalued by the public -
>  much like a currency floating on international exchange markets.

Great.