[EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent

[Michael Allan]

Raph Frank wrote:
> On 9/20/08, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:
> > [9] A secret ballot ... makes it a poor investment...
> >     It will also be a poor investment when the vote is recastable, as in
> >     a delegate cascade.  The vote might be public and compliance might be
> >     verified, but there is no guarantee of continued compliance.  The
> >     voter may take the money from one side, then shift her vote and take
> >     it from the other.
> 
> Also, if the system is just for communication and doesn't have the
> final say on things, then the secret ballot can still be used for
> final ratification.

True, the translation barrier (from open to secret ballots) is another
protection.  It's partial.  On its own, it cannot protect an open vote
from purchase for its signalling value (like a paid endorsement, or a
meeting stuffed with a paid audience).  And it cannot protect norms,
which are acted on by a different pathway.  The fallback defence for
these is recasting.

> >  Variant acts may be proposed.  Variant acts are acts that differ from
> >  the originally proposed act.  When a variant act is proposed, the
> >  participants do not gain another vote to cast.  Instead they gain a
> >  choice of which act to cast their vote for.
> 
> I wonder if approval vote might be better here.  Approval gives a
> better indication of concensus than plurality.
> 
> Perhaps both would be helpful.  Plurality shows the support for a
> specific proposal, but approval shows potential compromise options.

You are thinking of using approval/range voting to provide an
indicator of compromise *paths*?  Interesting.  It might be useful,
especially for norms.  Knowing that 2 candidate norms A and B *shared*
assent (many approving of both) would reveal an opportunity to create
a variant C that somehow combined the content of A and B.  Assent
might then shift to C.  (It need not be a "compromise" document,
technically speaking.  If A and B are mutually compatible, then C
might be purely an aggregate.)

It might be less useful for official elections, like for executives.
The only way to "combine" executive candidates A and B would be for
them to vote for each other as a team.  Usually a team cannot occupy a
single office.  They occupy a power structure, usually with a clear
chain of command.
 
-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/