[EM] Will to Compromise

[Raph Frank]

On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 1:05 AM, Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com> wrote:
> The abilities of nondeterministic methods to generate compromises is
> formidable, but since we speak of utility, I would like to point
> something out.
>
> 1) Using Bayesian utility, randomness is worse than FPTP.
>
> This is a pretty powerful indict, depending on how often the method
> has to resort to random ballot.

Hmm, I am not sure how true that is.  The randomness in those
simulations is picking a random candidate.

Random ballot should be superior to random candidate.

Perhaps, Warren can comment on which he actually used.

> 2) False compromises are damaging
>
> The reduced power of a majority means that at any choice with a
> greater-than-random-ballot average utility is a "good compromise"
> Notice how lousy the Bayesian utility of random ballot is and you
> begin to see my point.
>
> The fallback method produces crappy candidates.
> People are encouraged to compromise for crappy candidates.
>
> Also note that the method for determining the compromise is
> majoritarian (to the extent that approval is) so the intermediate
> compromise procedure is a red herring that produces some nasty
> side-effects.

It isn't entirely.  There randomness creates an incentive to approve
compromise candidates.  This means that it isn't like pure approval.
A 55% bloc that refuses to compromise and thus wins the approval
stage, will likely end up causing a compromise failure.  That is
completely different to an approval election where a 55% bloc can
guarantee a win.

I think that finding an acceptable compromise is an important point.
The specific method is separate from the concept that you can allow
voters to in effect trade their winning probability.

Strategy needs to be tested.  The example that was used was a 3
candidate race, finding a compromise is harder when there is more
candidates.