[EM] Utopian Parliament

[Michael Allan]

Greg Nisbet wrote:
> What is the best design for a legislature?
> 
> 1. districted single winner contests
> 2. party-based systems
> 3. mutlwinner methods
> 4. delegation
>
> ... So yeah, if there is some design for a legislature you consider
> superior to all others, do not hesitate to list it.

I would add:

  5. (i) open medium of assent + (ii) existing legislature
 
> My friend and I were debating Largest Rem + Referendum (2) vs Delegation (4).
> ...
> LRRef creates two entities: [public and parliament]

Likewise for (5).  There are two parts (i and ii).

(i). The open part is purely an institution of the public sphere,
embedded in everyday communities.  In it variant bills are drafted in
a medium of recombinant text while being simultaneously exposed to
delegate-cascade voting.  Its role is to express general, legislative
assent.

  http://zelea.com/project/textbender/d/overview.xht#Law-Making

  (this doc is rather dated)

We've since added the idea of storing the recombinant text in a "Wiki
cascade", which greatly simplifies implementation. [1]

(ii). The role of the other part (existing legislature) is to act on
the assent of the public.  So when a bill attains a certain level of
consensus in the open medium, the legislators (sitting MPs or
whatever) will pull it into the assembly, vote it up, and promulgate
it.  The timing will naturally be up to them.  They will be in
dialogue with the open part (i), but will not be forced by it.  (There
is no need for force, as incentives would be ample.)

(Is there a description of LRRef?  What is "Largest Rem"?)
 
> I argued that this division of labor benefits society. Parliament
> would represent society arbitrarily well. Assembling all of parliament
> is trivial. Largest Rem avoids the disadvantage of the long tail of
> Delegation parliament and putting legislation on the ballot allows
> LRRef to access the complete representation that Delegation advocates
> claim. ...

I justify a similar division (5) by reference to critical theory of
society.  It divides the public part of society into a public sphere
(part of the larger "lifeworld") and various governmental
institutions, including modern legislative assemblies (as parts of the
"system") [2].  The two parts are distinctive in theory, being subject
to different rationalities (communicative vs instrumental).  So our
"open legislature" is also split into two corresponding parts (i and
ii).  The design of each is tailored to match its place in society.

> ... Perhaps there is something to be said for eliminating the
> distinction between the rulers and the ruled, ...

If we are talking about law, then jurisprudence has something to say.
Mosts jurists would probably agree that the distinction between the
*subjects* and the *makers* of the law ought to be minimized.  They
say things like: "Those who must obey the law ought to agree to the
law."  The issue is one of legitimacy.

> ... but I'd say that the danger of the commodification of voting is
> more dangerous.

It need not be a show-stopper of a problem.  There are numerous
preventions and remedies to protect an open system from vote buying
(commodification).  Maybe the strongest is to use a continuous medium
in which the votes are shiftable.

 "Vote buying will be a poor investment.  The votes are too shifty.
  Voters will take the money and run: they'll take it from one side,
  then shift their votes and take it from the other." [1]

I feel there is little to choose between illegitimate force (of rulers
over ruled), and manipulations of the public sphere (by money or
power).  We want neither.  In both cases, it will help to cleanly
separate the medium of assent in the everyday "lifeworld" (i) from the
steering media (money and power) of the "system".  If we keep things
in their proper places, it should work OK.

(Greg, you've already dismissed this overall approach, claiming that
it would result in "involuntary changes to society" [3].  But it's
unclear what you meant by that.)

[1] http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-September/022519.html

[2] Jürgen Habermas.  1981.  The Theory of Communicative Action.
    Volume 2.  Lifeworld and System: a Critique of Functionalist
    Reason.  Translated by Thomas McCarthy, 1987.  Beacon Hill,
    Boston.

[3] http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-October/022967.html

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/