[EM] Voting Theory and Populism clarification

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Raph,

--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> a écrit :
> De: Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com>
> Objet: Re: [EM] Voting Theory and Populism clarification
> À: stepjak at yahoo.fr
> Cc: election-methods at electorama.com
> Date: Lundi 20 Octobre 2008, 6h59
> On Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 7:15 AM, Kevin Venzke
> <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> > Consider these sincere preference orders:
> >
> > 40 A>B>C
> > 20 B>A>C
> > 40 C>B>A
> >
> > I can't see any reason why it couldn't be
> expected that only A will
> > receive majority approval, but B would defeat A in a
> runoff.
> 
> Assume they use the 'approve the best of the top 2 +
> anyone you prefer
> to the expected winner'.

I can't understand why you left out the possibility that the "top two"
are considered to be A and C!

This should be quite possible if A and B are considered more similar to
each other than either is to C.

Kevin Venzke

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