[EM] Making a Bad Thing Worse

[Greg Nisbet]

On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 11:52 AM, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:30 AM, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Well, it depends on how popular the candidate is.  There would be some
>>> candidates who can disregard primary results and some who can't.  It
>>> only works for very popular candidates.  A reasonable number of
>>> candidates wouldn't be able to pull it off.
>>
>> Just because they can't pull it off won't stop them from trying. I
>> think the only reason candidate accept the results of primaries is
>> because they are forced to. The obstacles facing an independent
>> candidate are formidable. They aren't prevented from running for want
>> of trying.
>
> Right, but there is a difference between being prevented due to
> logistical problems and it being illegal.
>
>> What I am saying is, without legal force, primaries would be very
>> different. I was trying to say that my earlier criticism of primaries
>> does not apply to this because it candidates are not coerced into
>> participating in the primary.
>
> Candidates aren't coerced into participating in the primaries, they do
> it because the want the party nomination.

Because they cannot even run otherwise. I know it isn't the same as a
gun to your head, but it wouldn't even occur if they didn't have an
artificial monopoly on power.
>
> If the parties ran their own private primaries, then they candidates
> would still have to participate if they want the nomination.

There would be more competition at least.
>
>> They can run without participating at
>> all in the world absent the add-ons to FPTP.
>
> I think you underestimate the value of having a major party nomination
> in FPTP.  No matter how it works, the nomination of one of the two
> major parties is almost essential to winning.  The only people who
> might be able to get around it are previous winners/incumbents.

I think you underestimate the ego of candidates. They probably would
run if they could.
>
>> I said this because I don't see it accomplishing anything. First of
>> all the current system does not allow transfers, so that is pretty
>> much out of the question. Second I don't think it's going to give so
>> much power to people who weren't elected by name in the first place.
>
> It does allow transfers.  If you were elected as an Elector for the
> Green party, you are perfectly allowed to vote for the Republican
> candidate and can accept instructions based on the outcome of the
> Green-Republican negotiations.  Ofc, in some states, that would be
> illegal.

There's the anti-faithless elector law... but that isn't a transfer.
It's an insincere vote. You only get one shot at making your vote if
you are an elector. That makes it far inferior to even single winner
asset voting.
>
>> I'm not sure that any modfication to asset voting is sufficient to
>> solve your problem. I think the faults that plague IRV plague Asset
>> Voting as well (albeit to a lesser extent because of the restrictions
>> placed on who you can vote for).
>
> Some of the benefits are that the votes are transferred based on
> intelligence/tactics, this makes it potentially more resistant to
> strategy.

No, it makes strategy the norm.
>
> Think of it like declared strategy voting, except you pick a person to
> implement your strategy.

That would arguably make it easier, in fact incredibly simple, to vote
strategically, but do you actually want that to happen?
>
>> Compared to FPTP, it is about as expressive except you haven't a clue
>> how your vote will transfer in the future.
>
> If you vote for one of the expected top-2, you would probably be sure
> that he would keep your vote.

Which would ruin the point of asset-voting to begin with.
>
> Trusting elected officials is part of representative democracy.

Trusting voters is part of democracy. Why force them to trust candidates more?