[EM] Making a Bad Thing Worse

[Raph Frank]

On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 6:55 AM, Greg Nisbet <gregory.nisbet at gmail.com> wrote:
> My thoughts on primaries were challenged. Let me explain:
>
> Primaries may be the rational response to FPTP. It doesn't matter.
> Without Draconian sore loser, candidate oppression laws the parties
> would have no way of stopping popular primary rejects from running.

Well, it depends on how popular the candidate is.  There would be some
candidates who can disregard primary results and some who can't.  It
only works for very popular candidates.  A reasonable number of
candidates wouldn't be able to pull it off.

You have to convince all the supporters of the party that you are the
one who is going to win and not the one with your (old) party's label.
 You also have to convince them that setting aside the primary
(democratic) result is acceptable and also deflect accusation that you
will end up splitting the vote.

If 80% of candidates have to accept primary results, then they serve
some function.

> At the point where they are
> strictly voluntary vote pooling agreements, I argue they break so much
> continuity with the current system as not to be regarded as the same
> thing.

You mean, it would be a completely different system?  I am not sure it
would be that much different if they were voluntary ... except that
they possibly wouldn't happen.

> The Electoral College:
>
> Asset voting as a single winner voting
> method makes no sense.

Sure it does, think of it like IRV but with intelligent vote
transfers.  This helps solve some of the defects.

I am not entirely in favour of asset voting in this case, but it isn't
completely unreasonable.

My problem is that there are conflicts of interest.  For example,
let's say there are 3 candidates and the supporters have utilities of:

45: A(100)>B(70)>C(0)
10: B>A=C
45: C(100)>B(70)>A(0)

B is the condorcet winner.

Both A's and C's supporters would rather have B elected than a 50%
chance of their favourite being elected (70 utility vs (50/50 chance
between 100 and 0) ).

However, since the electors are likely to be much more partisan, the
makeup of the electors is likely to be something like

45: A(100)>B(10)>C(0)
10: B>A=C
45: C(100)>B(10)>A(0)

In this instance, both A's and C's electors would be willing to hold
out.  The end result is that B's supporters must pick one or other of
them.

One possible tactic for B's supporters would be to flick a coin in
public and say that they will 100% support the winner of the coin
toss, unless the loser agrees to support B.

Ofc, that can be countered by A and C committing to their candidate
publicly too.  Who would break first :p.

> First of all, this violates unrestricted domain. Voters
> should not have arbitrary limits placed on what they are able to vote
> for.

What limits?  Surely, the same applies to Congress, you are picking a
group of people to act on your behalf.

> The Senate:
>
> The United States' heritage as a federation has no impact whatsoever
> on the legitimacy of bending the will of the people. See You Can't
> Have it Both Ways.

The States agreed to it and that only makes sense as part of a federation.

> Two Parties:
>
> I think we pretty much agree that the Democrats and Republicans
> actively prevent competition through silly laws and their perpetual
> monopoly on power. I say monopoly because they are both relatively
> centrist. At least that is the impression I get.

There is an argument that this is a natural result of the 2 party
system.  If a party keeps losing, it moves towards the centre to pick
up more votes.  The other party then starts to lose, so it moves too.
In the end, they are very close to each other.