[EM] Range Voting vs Condorcet (Greg Nisbet)

[Raph Frank]

On Thu, Oct 16, 2008 at 3:38 PM, Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> wrote:
>> However, you do get degenerate societies where there is a majority
>> that is a bloc.
>
> That's exactly my point. There are lots of such examples which all show clearly that majoritarianism is not democratic.

The thing is that in such a case, it isn't really a single 'demos'.
It is two groups voting as one.

> That doesn't help because then the majority on issue A will still overrule the rest in every single decision on that issue. So a compromise option for that issue will have no chance.

You can still have compromises.

In fact, it can be helpful if multiple issues are voted as a single
unit.  This allows negotiation between factions in order to make up
the majority.

A faction can make compromises on issues that it doesn't care about in
order to get things that it does.  This requires there is no solid
bloc though.

For example, assuming there are 3 parties and 2 issues

45) A(+20) B(+10)
10) A(+1), B(-100)
45) A(-20) B(+10)

The middle group don't really care about policy A, but will be hurt
alot by policy B.

Policy A is supported by 55 to 45, so is passed.
Policy B is supported by 90 to 10, so is passed
The result is
45) +30
10) -99
45) -10
Total: -79

However, if the two policies are considered as one

Option 1: "Pass A and B"
45: +30
10: -99
45: -10

Option 2:"Pass B, but not A"
45: +10
10: -100
45: +10

Option 3: "Pass A, but not B"
45: 20
10: +1
45: -20

Option 4: "Pass neither"
45: 0
10: 0
45: 0

The best case scenario for the the 10 group is option 3.  They could
say to the top 45 that they will support policy A in exchange for
policy B being defeated.  If the top 45 refuse, then they can go to
the the bottom 45 and say they will vote against policy A in exchange
for policy B being defeated.  It is in the best interests of both to
agree.

It isn't entirely stable though.

> A split society will only function poorly when a majoritarian method is used. When they use a method like FAWRB instead, they will function well because then they will care what the other faction wants, will try to devise good compromise options, and will vote in a way which makes sure the good compromises are elected instead of the random ballot result. This is possible *precisely* because with a non-majoritarian method the majority cannot simply ignore the minority but has to figure out how to get them to approve a compromise that is sufficiently near to their favourite. Non-majoritarian methods encourage discourse and cooperation.

Sounds reasonable, the problem is that a) people don't like random
methods b) it will result in certain outlier elements in society
getting some power.

Perhaps a threshold could be set before a candidate can participate.

Each voter would be allowed to approve/disapprove the candidates and
then also cast their main vote (for the random system).  Any candidate
below 1/3 approval would be eliminated.

Alternatively, it might be a two stage system.  The first round would
reduce the candidate pool to those who have > 1/3 approval.

>
>> Germany has 'eternal' provisions.  Some amendment proposals can be
>> blocked by their Constitutional Court.  This I think is undemocratic.
>> The eternal provisions relate to fundamental rights, which is their
>> reasoning.
>
> The reason why we have such should be obvious from history. It saves us for example from such restrictions of civil rights our American fellows experience since 9/11.

It doesn't have to be easy to change, but it should be changable.

For example, it might be required to pass 3 referenda with at least 5
years between any 2 and if any fail, it has to start from the
beginning again.  This means that it takes 10 years minimum to change.

Also, the citizens of the US didn't get to vote on the restrictions of
civil rights directly.  It was handled by Congress.

> That someone was me.

Sorry, Greg didn't include your name in his post (or I couldn't find it).