[EM] Range > Condorcet (No idea who started this argument, sorry; I am Gregory Nisbet)

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Wed Oct 15 15:49:55 PDT 2008


Dear Kristofer,

you wrote:
> This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and 
> considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate 
> hated by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the 
> 51%. A strict interpretation of the majority criterion says that the 
> second candidate should win. The spirit of cardinal methods is that the 
> first candidate should win, even though it's possible to make cardinal 
> methods that pass strict Majority.

What does this "spirit" help when the result will still be the 2nd 
instead of the 1st candidate, because the method is majoritarian despite 
all cardinal flavour?

Again looking at my 55/45-example shows clearly that compromise 
candidates are not helped by voters' ability to express cardinal 
preferences but rather by methods which require also majority factions 
to cooperate with minorities in their own best interest, as is the case 
with D2MAC and FAWRB.

Would you bother to answer me on this?

Yours,
Jobst



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