[EM] language/framing quibble
Fred Gohlke
fredgohlke at verizon.net
Thu Oct 9 13:58:23 PDT 2008
Good Evening, Kristofer
Before responding to your most recent letter, I'd like to revisit a
topic mentioned in your letter of Fri, 26 Sep. In discussing the way a
group of three people might resolve a traffic question involving three
alternatives, each championed by a member of the group, you mentioned
the possibility of a fourth, unrepresented, alternative. I found your
suggestion stimulating.
It stimulated more than I expected because, in reflecting on it, I
recalled an aspect of human relations that influenced adoption of the
triad concept in the first place ... the tendency of small groups of
problem solvers to experience intuitive leaps.
In the hypothetical case we're discussing, the goal of the group is to
solve the problem. It is not uncommon for such efforts to produce
unanticipated results. Indeed, some enterprises seek such results with
'brainstorming' sessions. The chances of such mental leaps are severely
restricted (if even possible) when the decision-making group is
ideologically bound. The mind is a wonderful thing. We mustn't chain it.
And, now, to work ...
re: "... why are your web log entries timestamped 2010?"
Because the site puts the most recent posts at the point where they are
the first encountered by visitors. I asked the site how I could put the
material in 'book order', and they told me I'd have to reverse the
dates. I chose a future date, and made subsequent posts at earlier
dates to put the material in a logical order for the visitor.
With regard to focusing on the job our representatives do ...
"I can see the point you're making, but I think you should be
careful not to go to the other extreme, too. Opinions may
shift, but at the bottom of things, they're the people's
priorities of in what direction to take society. The vagaries
you speak of could be considered noise, and that noise is
being artificially increased by the two main parties, since if
they can convince their wing voters they represent their
opinion (or change their opinion), then those voters are more
likely to vote for them instead of not voting at all. That
doesn't mean that there's no signal, though, and where that
signal does exist, it should not be averaged out of existence
or amplified in some areas and attenuated in others (as could
happen if the majority of the majority is not equally much a
majority of the whole)."
re: "That doesn't mean that there's no signal, though, and where
that signal does exist, it should not be averaged out of
existence or amplified in some areas and attenuated in
others ..."
I agree, but believe the signal is strongest during the selection phase.
That is when people focus their attention on their "priorities of in
what direction to take society" and select the people they believe will
lead them in that direction.
re: "I think you should be careful not to go to the other
extreme, too."
That must always be a concern. However, the method incorporates the
safeguard of careful scrutiny during repetitive elections and a simple
means for adding other safeguards such as mandatory consultation and recall.
re: (regarding types of bias) "... the bias I'm talking about is
a distortion of the wishes of the people. A method that fails
mutual majority might pick a candidate where a majority
prefers one of a set that candidate isn't in, for instance;
and more concretely, Plurality squeezes out the center and
provides incentives for two-party rule."
We agree in our opposition to two-party rule. The method we are
discussing operates independent of parties. I'm not sure you agree it
does so in a satisfactory manner but, if not, I can't pinpoint how you
feel partisanship will retain dominance.
re: "That means that your system acts less quickly to change."
Yes, I think that's true. The question is whether or not that's a good
thing. I believe it is.
In the first place, our lives should be governed by what most of us
want, not the wishes of a raucous minority. In the second place,
nothing in the process impedes the normal functioning of partisanship.
Groups of like-minded people can still persuade the majority to accept
their view.
The two vital parts of the process are the guarantee that holders of
every view have an opportunity to persuade their peers of the wisdom of
their perceptions and the critical evaluations that take place at each
level. These features enhance the probability that beneficial changes
will be adopted.
re: "What I meant was that even if the majority were (by some
miracle) nonpartisan, parties would form out of necessity.
Plurality simply can't support a horde of independents. As
such, Plurality encourages the formation of parties, and of
parties to coalesce until there are two main blocks -- even
in the best case (where near-nobody is partisan), the nature
of Plurality, the method itself, shapes the results, meaning
that it definitely does so under less ideal conditions, such
as in the world today.
Whoops! I think I just grasped what you're saying. You're not talking
about the method by which candidates are selected. You're talking about
the way they are elected after they are selected. There are several
aspects to my response.
1) The dichotomy arises because the original draft was a method of
selecting representatives, not candidates. My associate in the U. K.
who plans to petition his Council to adopt the method, asked that we
change the proposal to be a nominating method rather than an electoral
method because that is the most he feels can be accomplished at present.
The proposal, as amended to suit the needs of the Sefton petition, is
what I posted on this site. In spite of that, I've continued to think
of and discuss the process as I originally drafted it; as an election
method. There is a profound difference between seeking an office and
holding an office and my remarks have failed to note the distinction.
2) The process, as described in the Sefton petition, will produce two
candidates from one ward, for election to a 66-member Council. The idea
is that the people of the Church ward will choose one of the two
candidates to represent them. However, the issue is clouded because
there will almost certainly be other candidates nominated by the present
establishment. The following comments are based on the (invalid)
assumption that the only candidates are those nominated by the process.
Since the process is not carried to election, partisans and vested
interests will certainly try to 'capture' the candidates. After the
candidates are selected, interested organizations will support one or
the other of the candidates as in line with their goals and influence
others to elect that candidate. Although the candidates, as selected,
are beholden to no-one, it is likely they will, in the natural pursuit
of their own interest, seek the endorsement of partisan groups in order
to insure their election. In doing so, they will undoubtedly promise to
support the goals of their supporters without regard to the public interest.
If this is the prognosis (and I believe it is), I agree with you. The
results will be unacceptable. What that tells me is that the process
must be carried on through election.
3) If the process is carried on through election, candidate's have no
need for the support of vested interests or partisans. Indeed, they
need to be seen as free of such influences. Thus, their self-interest
dictates that they maintain their integrity. After election, they will
be beholden to no-one, they will have attained their seats on their own
merit. That is a powerful stimulant for rectitude.
4) Partisanship will continue to function. Our representatives will, as
we all do, align themselves with other representatives who have similar
views. The huge difference is that they are not 'owned' by their
supporters. They will choose their associates freely rather than under
compulsion. They achieve their position on their merits and that gives
them the confidence to stand on the principles that raised them to office.
Vested interests and partisan groups will attempt to suborn them after
they are elected. That is an eventuality we can not ignore and must, at
some point, discuss in detail. For now, though, we can assert that our
representatives are not 'bought and paid for' before they are elected.
re: "My fixes to the system would be to have a somewhat larger
council size and use a PR method to pick more than one
representative/delegate to the next level."
Regarding the PR method you mention, can you give me something specific
on this point so I can consider it? The suggested method has three
people selecting one of their number to advance. Can you describe how
you would alter this?
re: "This weakens your aim, which is to retain the experienced
who can convince others ..."
I'm sorry, but that is not my aim. My aim is to improve the quality of
the individuals we elect to represent us in our government. The party
system elevates unprincipled people, by design. The prime requisite for
a party politician is the willingness and ability to 'sell his soul' for
election. There is not a single flaw in our government that can't be
traced directly to the corruption of the people we elect to represent us.
My goal is to change that. My aim is for people to evaluate each other
with regard to their views on matters of public interest. That is the
reason for making odinances and budgets available to the triads. We can
not guarantee they will discuss these matters ... they might spend their
time playing cards ... but it provides a focus and improves the
likelihood that they will. In fact, those who don't wish to discuss
these matters can be seen to be poor prospects for public office.
In the later stages, candidates have three and four weeks to evaluate
each other (I recommend they be given facilities for associating with
each other ... offices in which to meet and recreational facilities ...
so they can evaluate each other in various settings and circumstances.)
Ultimately, when they are required to select one of their number to
advance, they will not be making their decision based on propaganda,
innuendo or hearsay. They will make their decision based on the best
judgment they've been able to form about the people they have been
associating with for several weeks.
re: "... the problem, that legitimate shades of the people's idea
of how society should be run would otherwise be excluded ..."
This runs up against the everlasting question of "Who decides which are
'legitimate shades of the people's idea of how society should be run'?"
I submit the people others have decided are the best spokespeople for
their views are the most logical people to make such decisions. The
repetitive nature of elections insures that the topic is constantly
re-visited. Personally, I'd favor annual election cycles, but every two
years wouldn't be bad.
re: "The exact size of the council would have to be found out by
either trying, or by reasoning. I understand the reason for
picking three, as you gave in your earlier post, so it's
likely that inreasing the council size would make it less of
a discussion and more formal, which we don't want."
I'm not certain of this, but I believe you are using the word 'council'
to mean what I refer to when I say 'triad'. Changing the term stems
from the desire for a larger group size, so 'triad' would be
inappropriate. If I'm wrong in this, what follows is invalid.
As you note, I've explained the rationale for settling on a group size
of three. In addition, I think the size should be an odd number to
reduce the chance of deadlock and it should be appropriate in any
electoral jurisdiction, whether district, municipality, county, parish,
precinct, state, nation, township, or ward. You do not feel three is an
optimum size, but I'm not clear on why you feel that way. Can you
describe the purpose of increasing the size?
re: "What we'd need would be to understand how quickly the
council degrades as its size increases, in comparison to the
gains elsewhere (in accuracy and in agreement)."
This is an area where you appear to have some expertise. Do you think
it's possible to build a simulation which incorporates the reticence of
many people to speak up in the face of multiple people? These are the
very people who may have insight into the 'legitimate shades of the
people's idea of how society should be run'. If they are to be heard,
they must have an environment in which they can speak freely. There's a
better than even chance they will gain courage when they find their
views acceptable, even applauded, in small groups.
May I also note my conviction that increased size will not result in
gains in accuracy and in agreement. I am not convinced that one person
can reflect the views of eight people from a group of nine (for example)
people any better than, and perhaps not as well as, one person can
reflect the views of two people. I think your point is that, at a
subsequent level, one person is, indeed, selected to reflect the views
of eight people, but four of those people did not express their views to
the person selected.
Diagramatically,
a
a b c
ade bfg chi
where 'd' and 'e' select 'a', 'f' and 'g' select 'b', 'h' and 'i' select
'c', and at the next level, 'b' and 'c' select 'a', 'a' represents the
eight people, 'bcdefghi'. I believe you are suggesting it might be
better if the nine people selected their representative directly.
a
abcdefghi
In my tentative opinion (pending your analysis), I think a minority
opinion held by 'g' (for example) has a greater chance of influencing
the selection ... and the opinions ... of 'a' by 'g's influence on 'b'
than 'g' has of influencing 'a' directly, when 'g' must compete with
'bcdef' and 'hi'. One reason I think so is that 'b' is a better
spokesperson than 'g'. That's why 'b' is selected to speak for 'f' and 'g'.
Stated another way, it appears to me the competition of ideas faces
greater obstacles in larger groups. When 'g' is one of nine people, the
minority view must be offered in the face of greater opposition. Not
only is 'g' less likely to speak, but 'g's voice is more apt to be
stifled by the disagreeing majority.
Note also that, although I've shown 'b' as the selection of the group
'bfg', if 'g's presentation of the minority view is compelling, and 'g's
personality is not averse to advancement, 'g' may be selected to
advance, and, at the next level, 'g's presentation faces less
competition (in terms of voices) and a greater chance of acceptance.
re: "... there is still a limit to how wide a span a single
representative can hold - how many different solutions he
can contemplate and argue in favor of - so the method (and
any method) will still exhibit a quantization of the ideas
of the people, and the same question returns; is it worse or
better than other methods?"
An extremely inportant factor in determining the "span a single
representative can hold" is the openness of the representative's mind.
Representatives selected ideologically are, by definition,
narrow-minded. If our method produces representatives with more open
minds (as it is specifically designed to do) the span of concepts they
can entertain is much broader, naturally.
re: "(And also, is the quantization biased so that the method may
give feedback like the two-party entrenchment of Plurality?)"
So far, I've seen no reason to imagine that it will. The process does
not deny the existence of partisanship but avoids it by focusing on
issues facing the community. That one's ideological bent affects one's
view of those issues is a given, but the issue won't be decided on
ideological grounds but on the practicality and persuasiveness of the
proponent's arguments.
re: "... if the councilmembers can hold many opinions, or a range
of opinions, and deliberate among those, the effect of
exclusion is significantly reduced, but it'll still be
there, and it may or may not still exhibit the "shaving off
significant, but thinly spread, areas of opinion" effect,
only with ranges of opinion taking the place of stick-man
type "either you're with us or without us" opinions. I don't
know whether it would, since it'd depend not only on the
system, but also on the integrity of the councilmembers."
It is not practical, possible or desirable to represent all the opinions
extant. Whether a suggestion is significant depends on the views of
those who hear it as well as the persuasiveness with which it is
presented. Furthermore, its significance varies with its practicality
at the time it is offered. That which is impractical during one
election may be practical during the next.
The point is that significant opinions can (and will) be offered in
every election and the random selection of group members insures the
view will be presented to a wide sprectrum of the electorate. The fact
that the opinions are offered and discussed will influence the outcome,
depending on the multitude of factors surrounding it. We can not
guarantee that all opinions will be accepted. All we can do is provide
an environment in which all opinions will be heard.
The integrity issue is paramount. To quote something I once heard:
"... in looking for people to hire, you look for three
qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. And if they
don't have the first, the other two will kill you."
Several considerations led me to the method I've described, but assuring
the integrity of our representatives was foremost among them.
The question of integrity is subjective. We can never truly know what's
in another person's heart. Neither can we know how they will act in the
face of various challenges. All we can do is give ourselves a way to
evaluate each candidate's qualities over a sufficiently long period of
time to make a reasonably accurate judgment. Doing so repeatedly, with
ever more interested people, may not guarantee that we'll never select
an unprincipled individual, but the chances are incomparably better than
letting oligarchic party leaders make the selection for us.
re: "The councilmember could lie his way to the top. This could
be softened by recall; in some proposed council democracies,
the councils are permanent and a majority at level (n-1) can
recall a council at level n, but even with only the
population to have recall at the end of the process, it
would weaken the incentive to lie."
The councilmember that achieves selection (election) by duplicity
becomes (except for offices such as mayor, governor, president, or other
singularity) a member of a parliament, a town council, a diet, a
congress, or some such body. I submit their effect on the body will be
small, but that is only conjecture. The point is that such individuals
can be the spoiled apples that rot the barrel. That may be true, but it
takes time. It has taken over 200 years for our existing barrel to
reach its present stench. A fresh barrel will give us time to devise an
even better method.
re: "The closest example to councils of councils, that I know of,
with the attendant objection that councilmembers are not
accountable to the people because they can't be revoked, is
the Commission of the European Union. The Commission is made
up of members elected by the state governments, which are in
turn elected by the people; or even with one additional link
of indirection, through a parliament. Now, the analogy might
be weak, since the EC is limited by the effects of the
systems used to elect the intermediate steps, and possibly
also by the partisanship incentives you've talked about
earlier; and the "councils" are much larger than your triads
as well; but that's the closest we have. If the EC is a good
example, then accountability is going to be a problem."
I am not competent to offer an opinion on the Commission of the European
Union. The electoral method(s) you describe do suggest that
accountability would be a problem. As we've discussed here, it would be
trivial to add a recall capability to the Practical Democracy process.
I think it also worth noting that there are alternatives short of
recall. Even though my personal preference is to allow our
representatives use their judgment, the inherent bi-directionality of
the process allows direct transmission of questions on specific issues
to and from the electors. It gives us the means of guiding our
representatives.
re: "What happens if a triad is unable to agree upon a candidate?
Would it then be done by vote, random selection within the
council, or is that councilmember's position undetermined
and filled randomly at the next level?"
This question must be considered before implementation. My personal
preference is that the triad be disqualified. If the members of the
triad are so inflexible that they can not select one of their number as
the best choice of the group, they lack the qualities we need in our
leaders. If they are willing to disqualify themselves rather than make
a selection, we should grant them their wish. If this happens at the
final level, where a selection is mandatory, I'd suggest we form a new
triad by a random selection of three unselected people from the previous
level.
re: (with regard to the bi-directional nature of the process) "To
briefly repeat what I've said, I think bidirectionality is
going to be particularly important here, simply because the
method contains multiple elections (one for each level), not
just one, so the bidirectionality is not just from the final
to the people, but to all the other levels as well. Thus, if
there's a dilution of responsibility that must be
compensated for by bidirectionality, that dilution happens
multiple times, and so the compensation has to be all the
stronger."
I believe we agree on the importance of bi-directionality. Can I take
it that you mean by the latter part of your comment that the elected
official must be responsible to all those whose choices resulted in his
ultimate selection ... the entire chain of people from the first level
to the last? That is my view, and I believe it to be yours as well.
re: (with regard to the diagrammatic depiction of a single-axis
division of the electorate) "The relevance of this problem
as regards the council democracy / triad system is that the
"l" and "r" voters are majorities, but neither L (the
majority choice of the l-majority) nor R (the majority
choice of the r-majority) is a good candidate. This shows
how the true center may be eliminated for opinion ranges
(not binary opinions) in a kind of real-valued variant of
vote-splitting.
If the council deliberation works similar to Condorcet, the
effect will be weakened, since a Condorcet election with a
middle candidate inserted above (at 0.5) would elect the
middle candidate:
40: L > M > R (left-wing group)
10: M > R > L (middle group)
40: R > M > L (right-wing group)
and M is the Condorcet Winner.
The effect might happen between councils, though, even if
they don't happen (or happen only weakly) inside councils."
I'm sorry, but I do not understand the comment. My lack of
understanding may flow from my inability to envision the political
aspirations of humans as a single-axis phenomenon. Indeed, that was the
reason for my intial comment to Brian Olsen, on this thread. As well as
I can understand the description, it presumes the most important
question in an election is whether the left-wing group, the middle
group, or the right-wing group will triumph. From my perspective, the
only important question is whether or not the people triumph.
re: "Confidence in their position is a good thing, as long as
that projection does not lead from confidence to
overconfidence and detachment from those groups of the
people that do not share the councils' positions. Since a
majority is transformed into near-consensus as the
candidates/councilmembers bubble up through the levels, the
effect would probably be more severe the further up the
levels you got, and the more levels there are in general."
Detachment from the will of the people will invoke, at the very least,
rejection during the next candidate selection process. Clearly, limits
on terms of office are important, so officials are obliged to stay in
touch with their constituents.
This raises a side issue that should be considered at some time,
although probably not right now: Re-election is by no means assured
and, possibly, uncommon. I anticipate a high turnover rate because the
process is extremely sensitive to changing conditions. That's a good
thing for the people. However, if that's the case, we must provide
something similar to the G. I. Bill of Rights (used in the U. S. to help
military people rebuild their civilian lives after discharge) for public
officials who are not returned to office.
re: "... I've been considering similar ideas, myself; such as
laws having a sunset that depends on how great a majority
passed it, or on a president having a variable-time term
depending on his victory margin."
I enjoyed your suggestions for improving governance. Several of them
hadn't occurred to me and are worthy of careful thought.
There are, in my view. three fundamental things wrong with our political
system: The way we maintain our laws, the way we tax, and the way we
select those who represent us in our government. Unfortunately, it will
be impossible to improve the first two until we change the last.
I've been wondering ... do you think it would be possible to build a
table of points with some kind of 'rate of acceptance' for each of us,
and carry it forward from post to post? If we can find a way to do it,
it will help us identify our areas of disagreement and allow focus on
the most thorny parts.
Fred
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