[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines

Terry Bouricius terryb at burlingtontelecom.net
Sat Oct 4 06:29:54 PDT 2008


To put a different slant on James Gilmour's message bout fraud vs. wasted 
votes under plurality voting...

I'm sure Kathy Dopp (on this list for a few months now) will note that 
"high level" fraud is possible without detection on current voting 
technology, which is why systems should be universally subject to manual 
audits.  On the other hand, current plurality voting doesn't just "waste" 
votes, it often elects the "wrong" candidate even WITHOUT any fraud.

Under Plurality voting rules, a candidate can be declared elected who 
would lose in every possible one-on-one match up with each of the other 
candidates (the Condorcet Loser). This "winner" would also be outside the 
mutual-majority set (those candidates that a solid majority of all voters 
prefer over this plurality "winner").

The point is, that even with ZERO FRAUD, the current U.S. voting system 
regularly elects candidates that the majority of voters believe are the 
wrong ones.

Some election integrity activists have taken the mistaken stance that no 
improvement in voting methods should be pursued until the fraud issue is 
perfectly fixed. But in the mean time "honest" elections, using our 
defective plurality voting method, regularly elect the wrong candidate. A 
bit like obsessing on fixing the rotten clapboard on the back of the barn, 
while ignoring that the barn door is wide open and the cows are leaving.

Terry Bouricius

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "James Gilmour" <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>
To: <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>; "'Dave Ketchum'" <davek at clarityconnect.com>
Cc: <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 7:41 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines


> > Dave Ketchum wrote:
> > Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems,
> > such as Condorcet, are difficult with paper, but easily handled with
> > electronics.

Kathy Dopp  > Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 1:24 AM
> Well that is a very good reason to avoid implementing them -
> because if they can't be easily done with paper ballots, then
> they cannot be assured to be counted accurately.

This raises a very interesting point - how to balance the risk of failing 
to detect a low level of fraud against the known wasting
of very large numbers of votes by the plurality voting system.  (I say 
"low level of fraud", because any high level should be
readily detectable.)

Of course, we don't want any fraud, and we don't want any fraud to go 
undetected, and we don't want the outcome of any election
determined by fraud, no matter how low the level of that fraud may be. 
But to use the ease of detecting fraud as the sole criterion
for selecting a voting system is almost certainly to lose sight of the 
much larger "losses of votes" that occur in every plurality
election.

In the UK, Canada and in most countries using plurality (except USA), the 
voting system discards the votes of around half of those
who vote - sometimes a little more than half, sometimes a little less.  In 
some plurality elections large numbers of the elected
members are elected with only a minority of the votes cast in the 
single-member districts.  The evidence on this is abundant and
worldwide.  The exception is the USA, where, for example, in elections to 
the House of Representatives, only one-third of the votes
are wasted in this way.  The reason is probably related to successful 
incumbent gerrymandering of the district boundaries and to the
effects of holding primary elections.  But even in the USA, around 
one-third of the votes are wasted by the plurality voting system.

So to look at the overall picture with a voting system like plurality, 
should we reject any move to a voting system that would give
effect to more of the votes actually cast because it might be more 
difficult to detect a low level of fraud in such a voting system?

James
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