[EM] About Condorcet//Approval

[Diego Santos]

Many members of this list prefer a Condorcet method to any other voting
method, especially if it meets Smith. But how vulnerable are ranked methods
to strategic voting?

Consider these two assumptions:

1. Sincere Condorcet cycles would are too rare if used in real elections.
2. Strategies are somewhat common in contentions elections.

Compromising is almost unnecessary in River, Schulze or Ranked Pairs, but
these methods are vulnerable to burying. And still if a sincere Condorcet
winner exists, these methods have a possibility to elect a Condorcet loser,
because only rankings don't provide enough information to find the sincere
winner in all situations.

I don't have a proof, but I think that if a sincere Condorcet winner exists,
Smith//approval is the only method  resistant to both compromising and
burying strategies. This property is valid in all 3-candidate scenarios.

Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current favorite election
method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex algorithms to find a
winner.

-- 
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
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