[EM] Voting Theory and Populism

[Diego Santos]

Suppose this example under simple approval + top 2 runoff:

Sincere preferences:

8: A > B > C
7: B > A > C
6: C > B > A

In the first round, they decided to approve only their first preference:

8: A
7: B
6: C

C is eliminated.

In the second round, the 6 C voters will support B, then B wins.

To avoid this, the A party nominates a clone A*. Then, the first round is
changed to:

8: A, A*
7: B
6: C

Then A and A* are in the runoff with 8 approvals. I. e., App + t2r has the
same clone-help property like borda.

Under IAR, if A is the approval winner, the A* approval score is 4, and B
still is in the runoff. Then IAR reduces the probability that a candidate
wins because of strategic nomination.

2008/10/18 Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com>

> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 3:12 AM, Diego Santos <diego.renato at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > Hi Raph,
> >
> > 2008/10/18 Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com>
> >> What strategy is it designed to protect against?
> >
> > Improved Approval Runoff is a trying to fix Two-round runoff, to avoid
> cases
> > like 2002 French presidential election. You can approve your favourite
> > candidate with low chances of winning, and other satisfactory
> frontrunner.
>
> Why can't you do that in by just using approval + top 2 run off, why
> the need to have the half vote reweighting?
>



-- 
________________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
Mestrando em Ciência da Computação
COPIN - UFCG
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