[Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal

[Juho]

On May 27, 2008, at 1:29 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 02:23 PM 5/25/2008, Juho wrote:
>> On May 25, 2008, at 4:16 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>
>>> How about Asset Voting? It is a truly brillig method. Simple.
>>> Invented over a hundred and twenty years ago.
>>
>> I didn't include Asset Voting or related features since it includes
>> "cabinet negotiations" between the candidates and the to-be-elected
>> representatives. That may be considered to open too many doors for
>> the parties/groups/strong individuals to impact the outcome.
>> Delegable proxy represents the idea of bottom-up influencing in a
>> more basic way.
>
> Asset Voting is delegable proxy (or could be) with a secret ballot  
> ground stage. That's all.
>
> Tell me, if you were deciding on who is to represent you, wouldn't  
> you want to be able to sit down with candidates and ask questions?  
> Would you want this to be secret or public? Either could be  
> arranged, you know. Sequester the candidates who hold votes, like  
> they did in Venice, give them each a room and a terminal that  
> allows them to send messages to anyone. Public only. But I'm not  
> sure it's a good idea.

I think all methods allow this. It is very typical that candidates  
can arrange meetings where their potential voters may come and  
discuss with the candidates. I don't see how Asset Voting would be  
better than others here. (Was this the claim?)

Even if this type of meetings where candidates and voters meet face  
to face are arranged it is usually considered to be a good practice  
to keep the votes secret.

> I can say that personally, I'd like to be able to look the  
> candidates in the eye, see the high-bandwidth information that we  
> get from personal presence, ask questions and see immediate  
> responses, changes in respiration and pulse, body language, etc.  
> Not necessarily consciously. And there is no way to make that  
> public, in fact, with present technology (unless you spend a  
> fortune on each meeting, and even then, what would you do with all  
> that data?)
>
> Now, if you can't meet a candidate in person, how about someone you  
> choose meeting the candidate. You choose someone you *can* meet in  
> such a way. And that is whom you vote for in the election. Frankly,  
> it's *stupid* under Asset to vote directly for the famous person  
> who doesn't have time for you. You like that person, fine. Find  
> someone you trust who also likes that person. And if you can't,  
> well, that might say something to you!
>
> This is an example of applying party-system thinking to what,  
> though simple, is really a radical reform. Warren Smith didn't get  
> it, he was thinking of a candidate set more or less like what we  
> already see. What I see is that there could be, in a large  
> election, thousands upon thousands of "candidates." It would be the  
> *norm* that nobody gets a quota in a multiwinner election in the  
> secret ballot.
>
> But what is *not* secret is the vote reassignments. What an asset  
> holder in an Asset election is, is nothing other than an elector, a  
> public voter. That's crucial. The *negotiations* may be private,  
> but the voting is pubic. Some kinds of negotiations might be  
> illegal, that's another matter.
>
> Remember, all that is being chosen in an Asset PR election is an  
> assembly. If one thinks that "secret deals" are going to be  
> prevented by avoiding Asset Voting, what happens, then, once the  
> seats are assigned. There are now -- unless we go whole hog and  
> keep up with direct voting by electors allowed in the assembly --  
> specific people with voting power. Classic targets for corruption.  
> The more concentrated power, the more attractive it becomes. Asset  
> with direct voting is about the only idea I've seen that could  
> really address this; generally, when power is more broadly  
> distributed, corruption becomes more difficult, because it becomes  
> more expensive.
>
> In Asset with direct voting allowed, the seats are proxies and  
> represent the electors in deliberation. They also vote, but if an  
> elector votes directly, this vote power is subtracted (fractionally 
> ( from the vote of the seat. So, what a seat crucially does is to  
> present arguments, and that is public. Corrupt a seat, and you may  
> get corrupt arguments.
>
> But then around the seat is a penumbra of high-level proxies, i.e.,  
> electors holding lots of votes, and these are relatively likely to  
> take an active interest in the business of the assembly.  
> Collectively -- and they are in touch with each other -- they have  
> the power to remove the seat, if needed, and they can gut the  
> seat's voting power immediately even without removal process. On  
> the other hand, because the relationship is voluntary and  
> relatively uncoerced (for most seats), the level of trust and  
> communication between the seat and the direct providers of seat  
> votes should be high. And suddenly the seat is presenting some  
> weird argument that, yes, we should use voting machines with  
> particular specifications that favor a particular vendor. Why, ask  
> the direct supporters of the seat? "Uh, well, it's really  
> complicated, I'll get back to you next week...."
>
> You know what I think would really happen? Remember, these people  
> have good communication, they *like* each other. The seat would  
> privately tell the proxies, "They offered me ten million dollars if  
> I presented those arguments. Of course they are phoney baloney. I'm  
> about to retire anyway, and, of course, I'm going to publicly  
> present you with excellent arguments that this is great stuff to  
> buy. Privately, you know better. Do what you need to do, please  
> don't say I said this. So the seat makes his arguments, fulfilling  
> his agreement with the vendor. The proxies gut his voting power and  
> also spread contrary information through side channels and other  
> unbought seats, saying, "we just don't know what got into our  
> friend! maybe it's time for him to retire!" And he does and they  
> throw him a big party.
>
> When power is broadly distributed, it is much cheaper to put sales  
> efforts into providing arguments that will prevail. And that is  
> easiest if your intention is actually to serve, instead of to rip  
> off. One can get plenty wealthy providing good service. Corruption  
> only pays when it's a good buy, i.e., when you only have to buy off  
> a single individual or a few, because of their power. When the  
> numbers get large, it gets risker, for one thing, and it gets  
> highly inefficient. Those who would corrupt do so because they see  
> a profit in it. A few million dollars to make a few hundred  
> million? Of course! But if you have to pay off scads of people, and  
> if all those people can do is present arguments and relatively few  
> votes (they will lose votes if the arguments they make don't make  
> sense to their supporters, and because Asset doesn't need  
> campaigning, the same considerations don't apply as with more fixed  
> seats), you might as well simply present the arguments. You can do  
> that for free, and it's legal. If they are good arguments. That'  
> might cost some money. Start with good products!
>
>
>>>> After the lists of electable persons (candidates) have been created
>>>> we can arrange the election.  Winners will be simply picked by  
>>>> random
>>>> votes.
>>>
>>> How about simply allowing people to choose who represents them?
>>
>> At the end of my mail I mentioned delegable proxy as one method that
>> is "party agnostic". At this point I covered only the random ballot
>> based options (and tried to avoid collegial decision making as much
>> as possible).
>
> In other words, tried to avoid democracy, which is founded on  
> collegial decision making.

I avoided collegial decision making here since I proposed possible  
alternatives to Fred Gohlke's "rather collegially oriented" method  
(collegial = shared responsibility of making consensus decisions in a  
group; majority = decisions by 51%; random = decisions by lottery).

> This has been a point I've been making for a long time: voting is  
> actually a small part of democracy. Aggregation vs. deliberation.  
> Aggregation without deliberation is a pretty bad idea, it's  
> responsible for the worst in democracy.
>
>
>>>> (There are also other methods that are based on a very bottom-up
>>>> oriented approach like direct democracy and delegable proxy.)
>>
>> Btw, I should have mentioned also STV as one central "party agnostic"
>> method.
>
> Yes, in theory. But because it demands name recognition for the  
> candidates, and there are too many voters, in general, and too few  
> possible candidates, voters can't truly vote with complete  
> sincerity for the person they consider -- out of the whole world --  
> could best represent them.

Why does particularly STV demand "name recognition"?

> The only systems that allow that kind of sincerity (which really  
> ought to be obviously desirable, but which we are so far from that  
> we don't even think of it as missing), are Asset Voting and, yes,  
> Delegable Proxy. Same systems, really. (Asset leaves silent how the  
> electors negotiate the seats. Delegable proxy is a very simple way  
> that could be use to suggest vote assignments, spontaneously,  
> through electors simply choosing which person they most trust, this  
> time openly, using delegable proxy analysis to identify seat  
> candidates as being in proxy chains large enough to elect.
>
>>> Asset Voting is clean enough and simple enough and really can
>>> become DP beyond the secret ballot level.
>>
>> What property makes Asset Voting be better here? (DP and many methods
>> may have problems when votes become public, but why does Asset Voting
>> stand out here?)
>
> Asset Voting bridges the gap between secret ballot and public  
> voting. Delegable proxy requires public voting,

Why?

> in fact, or, in my opinion, it is far too dangerous. It's essential  
> that proxies and clients have direct communication, and that each  
> know who the other is.

My definition of DP doesn't require candidates to know their votes. I  
think also secret ballots are OK.

The reason why I positioned AV differently than DP is that the  
definition of AV seems to assume negotiations between the candidates  
that treat their votes as "assets" that they own (and since these  
negotiations would happen after the votes have been cast).

I used term DP as an abstract concept that defines how the votes of  
the candidates may accumulate bottom-up from the voters to the  
representatives in multiple steps.

> The theory of DP is that uncoerced choices, made with knowledge are  
> likely to collect trustworthiness. (i.e., the client is choosing a  
> proxy personally known to the client; in our proposals we usually  
> incorporate "acceptance" as part of the process, and discount  
> unaccepted proxy assignments; accepting a proxy is equivalent to  
> accepting communication, and I'd never give my proxy to someone who  
> didn't give me their phone number....)
>
> Asset, though, as normally described, creates a peer assembly,  
> through voluntary vote assignments. Now that there are public  
> electors, and a *relatively* small number of them (there may still  
> be many), and that there are now seats to represent all the  
> electors, and thus all the voters, in deliberation, direct voting  
> and, indeed, a consideration of the Electoral College, we could  
> call it, as a standing body that does not formallhy meet, but whose  
> members continue to represent those who voted for them, direct  
> voting becomes possible. The seats serve as proxies for this, but,  
> as with proxies in general, if the client (the elector) votes  
> directly, the proxy's vote doesn't count.
>
> Asset creates a peer assembly that would look like today's  
> assemblies. The process does not have to be reinvented. My opinion  
> is that direct votes would *ordinarily* not amount to much, but the  
> very possibility has some nice effects. First of all, it prevents  
> the seats from holding too much power, they could lose their seats  
> quickly (I'd have persistence of seats, but voting power can go in  
> a flash; a seat without voting power can still present motions,  
> etc., but can't vote on them.) Secondly, it allows true minority  
> groups, small numbers, to cooperate on a seat without thereby  
> having to accept all the views of that seat. If they are willing to  
> follow the assembly business and vote, they can. So really all they  
> *must* find is someone that will present to the assembly their most  
> notable arguments. Even if it is to say, "I don't necessarily  
> accept this, but I have constituents who believe that ... and in  
> fairness.... blah, blah."
>
> The point is to make the assembly truly representative of the  
> people, and *keep it that way.* The electors are not high-level  
> politicians, usually. They are relatively ordinary people who were  
> willing to become public voters. Under difficult conditions,  
> precautions might be needed to protect them; this would place  
> restrictions on the number of votes held by a public voter. (I.e.,  
> you can't allocate protective resources to every voter who decides,  
> "I want to vote in public," and there are certain other problems --  
> soluble, I believe -- with very small numbers of votes held, like  
> down in the twos or threes or so. Vote coercion becomes possible  
> when the numbers are very small.) (Possible solution: when  
> registering as a candidate, candidate names a proxy. Small numbers  
> of votes are not announced as going to that candidate, but to the  
> proxy. But all this is for difficult conditions. I don't see the  
> U.S. as being difficult in this way.)

Note that coercion covers (maybe typically) cases where a wife must  
vote for her husband (or get a black eye) and where a member of a  
(work/hobby) team must vote in line with the other members of the  
team in order to maintain credibility/trust/friends/job.

Juho




		
___________________________________________________________ 
Try the all-new Yahoo! Mail. "The New Version is radically easier to use" – The Wall Street Journal 
http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html