[Election-Methods] Partisan Politics + a method proposal

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Mon May 26 12:14:38 PDT 2008


On May 25, 2008, at 21:01 , Fred Gohlke wrote:

> If the 'black' person sees himself (and those like him) as at a  
> disadvantage, there is an excellent chance he will be more highly  
> motivated than his counterparts to seek a position from which he  
> can improve his (and their) lot.

Yes, many minority representatives may be highly motivated. (But they  
may also feel weaker, being against the majority opinion and less  
interested than the majority representatives.)

> In addition, the 'black' person is not without recourse.  When he  
> makes a choice, it can be one or the other of the whites ... or  
> neither.

Yes, he can influence, but if the other two are 'white' he may have  
to satisfy with a 'half white' solution anyway.

> And, as a last resort, if he perceives both of them as hostile, he  
> can assure that neither advances by not voting at all.

Also a majority representative in a group with two minority  
representatives might decide that since he was unlucky and ended  
"unfairly against all probabilities" in a group with two minority  
representatives it is fair enough not to vote at all.

> When viewed strictly in racial terms, the implication that two  
> whites will not select a 'black' is a bit extreme.

The technical problem is that any small bias will accumulate in the  
chained process. The voters thus need not hate the minority but just  
have some bias (to cause a bias to the proportionality).

In many questions it is also quite ok to have different opinions and  
favour them (unlike in the racial questions). Two greens and one blue  
in a room could mean that the greens will say "of course we will  
elect a green since green ideas are good". And that would be  
considered ok. They picked the best candidate at least from their  
point of view.

> When three randomly chosen people from a neighborhood select one  
> person to represent the other two, the chances are excellent that  
> they will reject those who are obviously unfit.  By the second  
> iteration, the most objectionable people will have been eliminated  
> by those who know them best.

Yes, the ones that are no good and who make that obvious also to  
others will not advance far.

> While it is not unreasonable to imagine the people at the first  
> level will pick those they believe best suited, those selected may  
> not have a desire for public office.

Yes, people who do not want the job will not go far.

(I was also not happy with the idea that those who want to advance do  
advance. Often it would be wise to elect people that would be happy  
to serve as the representatives of others but who do not have any  
unusually strong interest to take the power. Some people may also  
dislike politics since they expect those people to be corrupt/greedy/ 
power hungry etc. Of course most political systems have this problem.)

> One may argue that the majority of those who advance will be people  
> of poor judgment, but to do so is to assert that the people, in  
> general, lack the ability to discern between those of good judgment  
> and those of poor judgment.

This could be claimed to be a negative property of almost any  
political system. (The random vote based methods that I discussed  
would alleviate these problems.)

Here's one example. Two voters want less X, one voter wants more X.  
If the minority representative (who wants to advance) waits first to  
hear the opinions of the other two and then says "I also think less X  
might be better" or "both opinions have some justification" he may  
have better chances to proceed to the next level when compared to a  
situation where he is fully honest. It may thus pay off to hide one's  
true feelings and just be nice towards the others.

People who are caught lying would be kicked out soon but people who  
are "diplomatic" (and hide their intentions and smile in all  
directions despite of their inner strong feelings and intentions)  
could advance far. I mean that you are right that people tend to  
elect good people but on the other hand "bad" people do tricks that  
will help them advance far.

(One could say that the rules of politics typically favour people  
that are politicians by nature. This is good in some sense but bad in  
another. You should know what "politicians" are like and what kind of  
people typically climb the ladders to the political elite :-).)

> If that were true, the people would be incapable of governing  
> themselves, in which case discussing electoral methods is moot.   
> Thus, while it is not universally true that people of good judgment  
> will be selected, it is generally true and can be accepted as a  
> basis for proceeding.

Interesting. Modern democratic methods could be claimed to be the  
best known methods, and at the same time methods that do not work  
well. I have heard you "complain" that the current position of the  
parties is not what it should be. Current political systems (and also  
e.g. current market economy) may be better than the laws of jungle  
that they in a way have replaced. They certainly are not perfect and  
in my opinion they also have many characteristics that could be  
improved.

I think people are indeed both capable and incapable of governing  
themselves. Just look e.g. at the amount of violence the humans  
exercise against each others (i.e. within the same species, not only  
against other species and pray animals) at this planet at the moment.  
Is that sensible behaviour of a species that thinks it represents the  
best values of the universe? Maybe we are "out of jungle" but maybe  
not very far out yet :-).

> The effect of this circumstance is progressive; the further a  
> person advances, the more we can consider him a person of good  
> judgment.

Or a good crook. (Btw, I assumed above that you don't like the  
politicians that have populated the party offices today that much. Do  
you want to offer them ladders where they can compete with their  
climbing skills, maybe a more random style of election, or something  
else.)


> we must consider the incentives that might cause a person of good  
> judgment to select the poorer of the other two participants in his  
> group.

> IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

> Unless it is a preponderant majority, reliance on ideology alone  
> must ultimately fail to advance a supporter.

Yes, minorities tend to disappear, large majorities tend to advance.  
In binary questions like yes/no or more/less the bigger side tends to  
advance.

> In very small groups, practical considerations tend to take  
> precedence over ideological ones.  When three people spend an  
> extended period (days and weeks) to evaluate one another, the  
> topics they discuss are more apt to be matters of joint concern,  
> like taxes, area development, schools, congestion, employment,  
> health and the myriad other parts of everyday life than  
> abstractions like ideology or party.

Strategically it does not make sense to reveal that one belongs to an  
ideological minority. Better to talk about matters that are common to  
most people. Instead of saying "I'm a Communist" it might make more  
sense to start the discussion by saying "the current policy of  
President Bush might be slightly too right wing oriented since it has  
not received the support of all the citizens".

> The point is that, for the most part, the electorate is not a bunch  
> of stick figures, incapable of rational thought.

Yes, one should not bypass the discussion phase and thereby ignore  
the viewpoints that others maybe want to express.

> ECONOMIC BENEFIT

> bribe

Yes, to be avoided. In the triads their temporary and random nature  
decrease the risk. The fact that the decision makers are known and  
various discussions will take place between the members increases the  
risk.

The risk may be higher at the top levels. If there are some  
experienced politicians/negotiators left they could end up doing some  
horse trading (not necessarily direct bribes but maybe "some rewards  
to show good spirit" or "political agreements").

> I can not guarantee your concern "... that people that are good at  
> fooling other people and hiding their true (maybe less noble)  
> intentions will reach the top levels more often than others." is  
> unfounded. However, I believe careful thought on these points will  
> show the opposite is more likely.

I think both components are present. I think all political systems  
(see the current ones) tend to offer paths to the best climbers once  
they learn the tricks of the new systems. For this reason it is good  
to keep one's eyes open and monitor the behaviour of the system  
continuously, and not become complacent and see the current rules as  
"our perfect system". Better to have an attitude of "continuous  
improvements and patching too".

Juho





		
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