[Election-Methods] method design challenge + new method AMP
Jobst Heitzig
heitzig-j at web.de
Thu May 8 15:09:31 PDT 2008
Dear Raphfrk,
you wrote
> There needs to be some system for providing an incentive for people
> to give their honest ratings.? A random system with trading seems
> like a reasonable solution.
I am glad that I am no longer alone with this opinion...
> If a majority has a 100% chance of getting their candidate elected,
> then there is no incentive for them to trade.? If the voters are 100%
> strategic, they will know this.
Yes, although some Range Voting supporters try hard to convince us of
the opposite, it seems.
> OTOH, a support of a majority should be better than support of a
> minority.
Absolutely! Usually I consider Random Ballot a "benchmark" method for
this very reason: the "default" winning probability of a candidate
should equal the proportion of the voter who favour her. Any deviances
from this default distribution should be justified somehow, for example
by an increase in some measure of "social utility".
(The underlying rationale for methods like D2MAC or AMP is even
stronger: every voter should have full control over "her" share of the
winning probability, so that in particular when she bullet votes, this
share must goes to her favourite. Only such methods are truly
"democratic".)
> Optimal utility via trade requires that voters have something to
> trade, and fractions of a win probability seems to be quite a
> reasonable solution.
I cannot really imagine any other thing unless we consider money
transfers...
Yours, Jobst
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