[Election-Methods] Partisan Politics

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:52 PM 5/7/2008, Fred Gohlke wrote:
>Good Evening, Juho
>
>re: "I already commented earlier that the "groups of three" based 
>method that you have studied does not implement proportionality in 
>the traditional way."
>
>You're right.  It's not traditional, but it sure is 
>proportional.  One of the unspecified conditions I intended for the 
>'groups of three' method was that participation in the election 
>process should be mandatory, as it is in (I believe) Australia, 
>Singapore and New Zealand.  If every person in the electorate 
>participates in the process of selecting those who will represent 
>them in their government, there can be no greater proportionality.

The problem is that selection takes place in assigned groups, and 
that causes "proportionality" to disappear beyond the very primitive 
proportionality that can exist in a group of three choosing one. The 
groups will indeed represent factions; however, I haven't seen any 
analysis from Mr. Gohlke as to how this affect proportionality, just 
assertions.

Mandatory participation is just one aspect of the coercive nature of 
this proposal. Highly restrictive rules on how representatives are 
chosen are its nature. It requires trusting the "authorities" in ways 
that could be extraordinarily difficult to prove. By selective 
assignment of people to the groups, one could actually bury any 
minority effectively. Just insure that few groups have two members of 
that minority.

Coerced voting requires the participation of people who have no idea 
what they are voting about. In Australian, "donkey voting" is common, 
where people just mark the ballots in the most convenient way in 
races they don't know about. It's great to make voting easy. Not 
great to require it. Participation bias is actually a phenomenon 
which can be shown, through social utility analysis, to improve 
election results from the point of view of overall social 
satisfaction with the results. It's a form of rough Range voting.

As to proportionality, STV is in common use -- including in Australia 
-- and, with large enough districts (i.e., many members) it is quite 
good, but still depends on the political system. However, there is 
another method which is far, far simpler and which is *totally* 
proportional, in which all voters actively participate, and all 
voters and votes count, and a resulting Assembly is as proportional 
as is possible. I.e., any faction large enough to command a quota of 
votes is seated.

It's now called Asset Voting, but it was first proposed by Lewis 
Carroll in about 1886. A ballot could be as simple as a standard 
vote-for-one Plurality ballot, though there are better possible 
designs. (Warren Smith, who named it Asset Voting, used real numbers 
for each vote in the range of 0-1, with the constraint that all votes 
must add up to 1 (or less. That's probably impracticably complex, but 
there is a simpler variant I called FAAV: Fractional Approval Asset 
Voting. Pretty simple: vote for as many as you like. Your single vote 
will be divided equally among them.) Then, if any candidate receives 
a quota of votes, they are elected. All surplus votes are "assets" of 
the candidate receiving them, and the candidate may recast them at 
will to create seats. They do this deliberatively. And Delegable 
Proxy could make this renegotiation very simple, even for candidates 
holding as few as one vote. And direct democracy for the Assembly 
becomes possible, i.e., direct voting becomes a possibility, even 
though representation in deliberation must be restricted to elected seats.

(I call candidates who have received votes "electors," because that 
is what they are, they are public voters. If an elector, who doesn't 
have a seat, votes, his or her vote is subtracted frationally from 
the vote of the seat. Normally, these direct votes, I expect, would 
only be a small fraction of the total votes on any issue, but that 
they are possible means that citizens would be directly represented 
by people they chose, without restriction beyond simple eligibility 
to receive votes, which could be very simple indeed. Probably 
registration of consent to receive votes, being already a registered 
voter and not otherwise disqualified, would do it.)

>re: "Large parties (or whatever opinion camps) tend to get more 
>representatives to the higher layers (more than their proportional size is)."
>
>Is that assertion not based on the assumption that large parties (or 
>opinion camps) must dominate our political existence?

No. It's a statement of fact, as to what will happen if such parties 
exist. Now, given that they do exist, another "feature" of this 
method might be that they will be outlawed, and anyone found guilty 
of voting in accordance with party recommendations would be 
disqualified from voting.

Asset Voting makes parties irrelevant for the purpose of finding 
representation. If you want to elect based on party, fine. You can do 
it. The method doesn't care.

>  What is, is not necessarily what must be.  Partisan interest can 
> not compete with private interest when private interest is given a 
> means of expression. When each member of the electorate can pursue 
> their own political interest, the sum total of their interests must 
> always be the interest of society.

This system gives almost no means of expression beyond a very 
primitive choice of one out of three. It sets up a vast and complex 
bureaucracy, necessary to administer and enforce the rules. It's 
really a bad idea, as expressed. It is similar, in certain 
theoretical ways, to delegable proxy, which is coming to be 
considered a very good idea, but the difference is fundamental: 
participation in groups is *ordered* by the system, not by free 
choice. As such, I don't consider it a democratic method, and don't 
consider that the Assembly it elects would be representative of the 
free choices of the people. That existing systems are defective 
doesn't change this. The existing systems might actually be *more* 
representative.

What this system is doing is forcing compromises to take place at a 
low level, thus not allowing full expression of any idea that doesn't 
enjoy at least one-third support (even if all the random assignment 
is unbiased, and without actually doing the math.)

Low-level compromise practically guarantees that it won't be 
intelligent compromise. Consider image recognition. We see something. 
Is it our spouse? Now, suppose that every three neurons must make the 
decision, passing this decision up. Something that can fool single 
neurons can fool our system. But recognition when far more complex 
relationships can be considered can take place more accurately. 
Neurons in our real brain are connected in very complex ways that are 
ad-hoc based on history. They are not rigidly connected in a 
numerical hierarchy with the concentration being fixed at some very 
small number, and the decisions they make are not black and white, 
even though the signalling is at any moment binary. Over time, the 
signalling is a Range vote, with the number of nerve firings 
representing the intensity of the recognition. Warren Smith is 
correct. Range Voting is very, very old. But it's range voting in a 
network of connections that is very, very complex.

Like the fractal structure that delegable proxy creates. There is no 
fixed group size, but the "elections" are all unanimous. Essentially, 
when used for recognition, voters associate and connect themselves 
with their choice, and the group is what we call a "natural caucus," 
that is, all those who have selected a proxy, directly or indirectly, 
plus the proxy himself or herself. And then these proxies, again, 
associated themselves voluntarily, forming larger and larger natural 
caucuses, until a natural caucus is large enough to merit a seat. As 
they become larger, they incorporate compromises naturally, without 
any coercion beyond natural restraints. I.e., if a caucus is too 
small to merit a seat, the proxy leading that caucus must make some 
compromise, negotiated freely but with that natural restraint, in 
order to gain representation.

And this can all be done, actually, without changing the laws. Just 
create the structures, use them to develop advice, and well-advised 
voters can pretty much control any existing democratic structure, 
better than any special-interest group. This is the FA/DP concept, 
and some very bright people have been essentially signing up. Still 
takes time. Most people simply don't believe it is possible, and the 
belief tends to keep them from examining it carefully. Natural 
resistance. It can be overcome with patience, with time.

>When people have an opportunity to exercise their own judgment, they 
>may be influenced by family, race, education, partisanship, national 
>heritage, age, health and a multitude of other minor considerations, 
>but none of these will override their vital interest in the specific 
>issues of their time and place.  If the preponderance of a community 
>has a coherent desire, it will, given the means to do so, achieve it 
>... regardless of whether the desire is labeled liberal, 
>conservative, or any other doctrine.

Sure. And they can do that now. And they do, actually. That's how the 
existing system works! But, as presently structured, it's not 
terribly reliable, and the effort involved can be too much for 
routine application. People have other things to do!

>It is a fallacy bordering on foolhardiness to seek the solution to 
>societal problems in doctrinaire proposals.  The difficulties we 
>face, the wars we wage, the threat to our environment, are 
>real.  They require real thought, not the pseudo-thought of 
>partisanship.  Doctrines may attract adherents but they beget 
>confrontations rather than solutions.

Problem is, Mr. Gohlke, it seems your proposal is, for you, 
doctrinaire. You've shown no willingness to actually examine 
objectively the true objections to it, nor to consider other 
proposals. You are right about doctrines. There can be unorthodox 
doctrines as well, starting with the very common, "I'm right and my 
ideas are the best."

>That the concepts I speak of do not exist is a given.  The question 
>in my mind is whether we can look past the mind-numbing influence of 
>partisanship to seek empowerment of the humans among us.

How about the mind-numbing constraint of "I invented this"?

One of the exciting things about delegable proxy is that it is 
essentially an intelligent filter for ideas. If there is something 
better than FA/DP, I'm quite sure that an FA/DP organization would 
quickly and efficiently find it. If I have designed a better 
mousetrap, I don't have to hire a marketing firm, I only have to 
convince one person, my proxy, and the idea moves to a higher level. 
And if I can't convince my proxy, I have a choice: My proxy, contrary 
to what happens now, will explain to me *why* he's not buying it, so 
one choice I have is to realize that maybe it wasn't such a good 
idea. The other choice is that if I can convince anyone else, someone 
with a different proxy, the idea still has a chance.

Delegable proxy sets up a collective intelligence. Most of what 
neurons do is *filter*. Proxies are filters. And my input is going to 
be filtered by someone I choose, not by someone assigned to me by 
someone else or by some other body, just as a majority of voters in 
my district. Or group of three.

Some unrequested advice, Mr. Gohlke. I wrote about delegable proxy 
for a couple of years before anyone got it, more than quickly saying 
"great idea!" followed by a rapid change of subject and no futher 
expressed interest. So I don't want you to just give up. What I did 
was to participate in election methods groups, taking a more general 
interest in the topic. And I brought up delegable proxy when it 
seemed appropriate. Gradually, I came to be seen as something more 
than a fanatic with a one-track mind, and, eventually, someone 
actually started asking the necessary questions. I answered them, and 
those became the FAQ at http://beyondpolitics.org/wiki, and others 
began to promote the idea. It's still all very small, at a very early 
stage. But compared to where I started, worlds of progress have been 
made. And then some of the historical connections started to appear, 
as there were more and more people becoming interested and reporting 
on their reading and reseach. It was only recently that we found the 
work of Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), for example, who was actually a 
major election theorist of the nineteenth century.

There is nothing new under the sun. Delegable proxy, like Range 
voting, simulates what nature evolved long ago. It already exists in 
society, but informally, and being informal and not clearly 
organized, it can't match the power of formal organization. I.e., 
political parties, special interest groups and lobbies.

But if you can't hear this, Mr. Gohlke, I'm afraid you may spin your 
wheels and waste your time, as many others have before you. I'm very 
aware of how limited my time is. I want to use it effectively, for 
the benefit of my children and their descendants and for society as a 
whole. It's my legacy; I'm not likely to leave a lot of cash!