[Election-Methods] Non-optimal satisfaction measure with average rating

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Stéphane,

--- Stéphane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> a écrit :
> Counter-example:
> Lets assume ballots represent sincere ratings.
> 50%: A-100 B-70 C-0
> 30%: B-100  C- 90 A-0
> 20%: C-100 A-10 B-0
> Average ratings: A-52 B-65 C-47
> Outcome: B wins
> Satisfaction: 30%
> A method delivering A as a winner would produce a 50% satisfaction
> measure.
> 
> I do not maximize social utility. But rather individual approbation.
> I compare the global result with the optimal result according to the
> voter.
> The optimal result is defined as the  elected representatives that would 
> be obtained if every other
> voters with the same opportunity than the reference voter had voted like 
> the reference voter.
> Maybe satisfaction is not the proper terminology.

Ok. Maybe you've explained this already, but how do you determine then that
SNTV isn't the method that maximizes satisfaction? Or would you say that it
does?

Specifically it seems to me that if you just elect the top X FPP candidates
in an X-seat election, you maximize the number of voters that got their
favorite elected.

Kevin Venzke

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