[Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

raphfrk at netscape.net raphfrk at netscape.net
Thu May 8 14:29:20 PDT 2008

 Juho wrote:
> The problem is that these two sets of votes are identical:?
> 51: X1>X2>X3>X4?

> 49: X4>X3>X2>X1 

Ahh, good point.

There needs to be some system for providing an incentive for people to give their honest ratings.? A random system with trading seems like a reasonable solution.

If a majority has a 100% chance of getting their candidate elected, then there is no incentive for them to trade.? If the voters are 100% strategic, they will know this.

OTOH, a support of a majority should be better than support of a minority.

Another option is to have it so that the election can fail unless >X% of the voters agree with the result.

X might be 2/3.? 

If there is no winner, the previous holder stays in office, or the office remains vacant.

Another option is that a candidate who only wins with 51% support has reduced powers or maybe a reduced term. 

Optimal utility via trade requires that voters have something to trade, and fractions of a win probability seems to be quite a reasonable solution.

Ofc, another problem is how to handle X:100, all the rest 0 voters.? 

Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"



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