# [Election-Methods] YN model - simple voting model in which range optimal, others not

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Tue Mar 25 12:27:56 PDT 2008

```At 01:02 AM 3/24/2008, you wrote:
>Yeah, I'm confused too.  I haven't even figured out how second choices
>are determined for IRV and Condorcet.

"Even"? That's much harder and was not specified. The first problem
is easy. Just read the thing, and don't make assumptions. It was
stated accurately. That is a standard voting table: This many voters
held this specific position and would therefore vote, in Plurality,
for the candidate holding the same exact position as they do.

As to ranked methods, there are various ways to do it. You simply
need a way to determine how the voters rank candidates. The most
obvious (but by no means necessary) way would be that all 4-issue
matches would be preferred to all 3-issue matches, all 3s to all 2s,
etc. But there are four 3-issue-matches for each voter. So how do you
discriminate between them, if the method does not allow equal
ranking? I assumed that match pattern was a binary number, and that,
if the number of matches was the same, the candidate with the higher
value match pattern was the preferred one.

So, for example, suppose a voter's pattern is

YYYN, and a candidate is:
NYYY. The match digit is 1 if the digits match and 0 if they do not.
So the match pattern here is
0110.

This is a 2-candidate match. Consider

YYYN (same voter as above) and
YNNN. Match pattern:
1001.

This is also a 2-candidate match, thus ranked in the 2-candidate
block. Within that block it is preferred to the first one described,
because the value is higher. (This is a result of the values assigned
to binary digits, the left-most one has the highest value).

```