[Election-Methods] Determining representativeness of multiwinner methods

[Juho]

On Jun 25, 2008, at 21:05 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

> Juho wrote:
>> On Jun 24, 2008, at 0:34 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>> What do you mean by "methods that allow candidates to form a
>>> tree like structure"? Something like delegable proxy, or just
>>> preference ballots with parties instead of candidates? Or
>>> nontraditional nested democracy (groups elect members to an
>>> assembly - groups of assemblies elect members to a second-
>>> level assembly, onwards up to global issues)?
>> I was thinking about the traditional party structure and  
>> proportional methods and how they may provide quite exact  
>> proportionality between parties but how they can not provide  
>> proportionality in any more detailed level. In this set-up it is  
>> possible to split one party e.g. to the green wing and others, and  
>> then the green wing could consist of radical and moderate greens.  
>> A vote to the radical greens (of this party) would be a vote also  
>> to the green wing in general and to the party in general.
>> The point was that now you could have even the binary decisions  
>> "stacked" in the party hierarchy (at least if the tree would be a  
>> binary tree). In this model it would also make a difference if you  
>> vote the green wing of the socialists or the socialist wing of the  
>> greens (order of priority).
>
> If the parties as well as their respective divisions (and  
> subdivisions) were to produce their own party lists, that would be  
> a whole lot of lists.

That could be one big poster where the candidates are listed on the  
right hand side and the left hand side is used for representing the  
tree structure (and the names of the parties and the subgroups).

> One might be able to get the effect without all the lists by having  
> a candidate ranking option, similar to "voting above the line" but  
> with candidates instead of parties.

I'm not sure if I got this right. STV is one basic proportional  
method where candidates are ranked. The tree structure is simpler in  
the sense that the voter votes simply just one candidate. It may be a  
problem to the voters to evaluate all the numerous candidates  
separately (if there is no structure and no "lists"). The fact that  
candidates themselves determine the order of inheritance and that the  
structure is limited to a tree format may also be considered a  
simplifying factor from the voter point of view (sets some  
limitations too, but maybe not crucial). Candidates in a way commit  
to the policy that they state (e.g. "I'll fight for socialism and  
secondarily for green values"). The tree structure is interesting  
also in the sense that it allows voters to influence and determine  
the direction that each party will take better than currently typical  
monolithic parties (proportionality is not provided inside the parties).

> A voter voting for a radical green submits an approval or plurality- 
> type ballot for the radical green, and the system substitutes this  
> with "RadicalGreen1(Party F) > RadicalGreen2(Party F) >  
> ModerateGreen1 > .... > Mainstream1(Party F) > ... > Whoever(Party  
> X) > SomeoneElse(Party Y)". That is, the nesting is done implicitly  
> in the ranking substitution, after which the ranked votes are input  
> into your favorite multiwinner method.

I assume that the candidate provided the ranking order. This is more  
flexible than the tree structure but also more confusing from the  
voter point of view.

Fiji has btw had some problems with candidates (parties) that look  
like representing X but their votes are inherited by candidates that  
do not represent X. Reading all the inheritance lists (even more  
lists) and understanding the impact of vote transfers was obviously  
too difficult. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system_of_Fiji>

> The substituted ranks (candidate-individual automatic how-to-vote  
> cards) would nest outwards, from the small wings to the  
> increasingly larger ones within the party itself, then on to other  
> parties in preference. In a sense, they are "lists" of their own,  
> and so the problem isn't completely avoided.

Are there some specific cases where the tree like inheritance order  
is clearly not sufficient?

> In an ideal world, one could argue that if voters assume a  
> candidate is acceptable (if not, why would they vote for them?)  
> then they could also reasonably assume that the candidate's premade  
> substitute rank can be trusted. But in reality one may pick a  
> candidate not because he's absolutely trustworthy, but because the  
> others are worse, and the method in any case amplifies central  
> power (like closed list PR does, and for pretty much the same reason).

The complexity of the inheritance lists, the amount of work that  
voters need to do to find their optimal vote and the Fiji case make  
the simple tree structure look more practical (although STV and the  
substituted ranks (inheritance lists on automatic how-to-vote cards)  
are more flexible). STV is used in practice though, so it can't be  
overly difficult to the voters.

Juho



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