[Election-Methods] delegate cascade

[Michael Allan]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
> But, again, this is a utopian scheme. It's not far away from what we
> have, but what can be implemented immediately is the FA/DP concept,
> outside of government... 

But I am not proposing to implement any changes *within* government.
That would be utopian, I agree.  The software I am developing is for
communities to use, not for governments.  The community for the beta
trials will be Toronto, for example - with other communities being
free to conduct parallel trials, if they wish.  Government will not be
involved.

> ...I prefer to work it all out in Free Associations [FA] first,
> where it is fail-safe, before putting much effort into control
> structures where governmental power is at stake, or substantial
> collected assets.

If the societal effects could be contained... but how?  Your
definition for FA is similar to what I call a "community" in the
public sphere - a group of equal peers in open communication with each
other.  I cannot imagine any restricted form of FA or community that
could serve as a "fail-safe container" for DP, where we could conduct
isolated "experiments".  There is nothing to prevent someone (less
cautious) from replicating the experiments more broadly.

Also, the technology will be better if we develop it in a real
context, where real political issues are at stake.  We'll then be
forced to deal with the actual design constraints up front, rather
than guessing at them from an artifical context.

Lastly, if we do not develop it ourselves for mainstream, popular
applications, then business concerns will do the job for us.  They'll
lock it up with patents.  We'll end up with an electoral interface
that pushes paid ad-spam at us, or worse.  It might take years to undo
the damage.

>> ...how vote delegation relates to power delegation.  If my
>> neighbour has leadership qualities, and I vote for her as Mayor (my
>> delegate)... [might] the Mayor delegate actual power to her...?
>
> Sure. Why not? With Asset Voting, I see the electoral college becoming an 
> extension, from one perspective, of the Assembly. But it is also a broad 
> contact network. You want to get a message to a Seat in the Assembly? You 
> know who your vote elected. That Seat will likely have many electors who 
> gave the Seat the votes to fill the quota. You also know, definitely, who 
> you voted for. Likely this is someone you know. So you have an identified 
> communication path to the Seat, with likely rapport of some kind...

I agree, communication and rapport are critical.  They'll affect how
the power structure and voting patterns intermesh.  The power
structure will affect vote placement, pulling votes up from the
bottom.  By the same token, voting patterns will affect the delegation
of power, pulling power out from the center.  It appears that the
whole power/vote structure will crystallize simultaneously.

(When the executive's term ends, I imagine the combined structure will
either hold steady, or it will rapidly re-form itself into a
different, stable configuration.  Presumeably this will occur before
we go to the conventional polls, so we'll know in advance who we've
chosen.  If we vote rationally, we'll simply ratify that choice on
election day.)

But I forsee no essential role for an "Assembly".  It's not needed.
DP can bypass an assembly, serving as an institution for deliberation
and construction of laws and other norms.  It can do everything except
the final promulgation of the norm.  So maybe assemblies will become
"clearing houses" (mostly a rubber stamping role) between fluid
communities of norm drafters, on the one hand, and the rigid structure
of power, on the other.

Juho wrote:
>
>>    (4)
>>
>>
>>      \      \  |  /      /         \  |  /
>>       \      \ | /      /           \ | /
>>
>>    ---  E -->  C  <-- D  ---     ---  X  ---
>>
>>       /      / |  \     \           / |  \
>>      /      /  |   \     \         /  |   \
>
> In my "potential problem case" I was maybe most interested in a situation 
> where we would have three different D clones, D, D2 and D3. Their opinions 
> would be relatively similar and their agenda towards influencing C would be 
> quite similar. Maybe the ambition of all of them is to one day become a 
> central figure like "C" or "X". They need to reorganize to be able to 
> influence C better (otherwise E is too strong with his opposing opinions). 
> They could organize themselves either C<-D1<-D2&D3 or C<-D2<-D1&D3 or 
> C<-D3<-D1&D2. They all wonder which one of them will get the best seat 
> here. (My point was just that this kind of interests may keep the tree 
> flatter than what would be optimal.)

I confused the picture by switching between two kinds of election,
with two different issues.  Voting behaviour depends on the issue,
either:

  a) normative election (for a particular policy, law, or plan)

  b) power election (for a particular office)

(a).  In a normative election, where D and D2 have identical interests
(as you say) the best position is actually the furthest from the root,
out in the leaves.  Whoever is closest to the root will be doing the
most work; whoever is furthest, the least.  So if D is already
drafting the shared interest, and spending the effort to "push" it
rootward, then D2's best option is to relax and vote for D.  The
formal pattern of vote flow will therefore spread out to match (more
or less exactly) the actual pattern of interest in the community of
voters.

(That pattern will be dynamic, however, because it will depend on the
current state of norm construction.  As soon as the shared interest is
successfully pushed rootward and drafted into the consensus, then the
question for D and D2 becomes "what next?"  If they have different
answers at that point - different interests - they will go swinging
off in pursuit of them, ending up in different parts of the tree or
forest.)

(b).  In a power election, the vote flow is still an open question.
It will probably be less dynamic, maybe even fixed and rigid.  It will
probably align with the structure of power (as Abd suggested above).
Its analysis therefore requires a political and social context.
Here's a scenario, by way of context:

  (S).  The young people in a certain neighbourhood wish to make
  improvements to their local playground or park.  They come up with a
  plan and begin to promote it locally.  Some of them are in
  disagreement and propose alternative plans.  They all have access to
  a new kind of electoral medium.  They use the medium to highlight
  their differences and to resolve them one by one.  Eventually they
  reach a general agreement on a consensus plan.  The City sends a
  safety inspector to the site, and trucks in some sand.  With a
  little help, the young people complete the improvements to the park.

And, to explain how power is applied:

  (ad S).  M is a community leader in the neighbourhood.  She has a
  large share of the votes as a local delegate in the open election
  for Mayor.  When she learns of the plans to improve the local park
  she takes an interest.  She speaks to another person in the
  neighbourhood (H).  H is a local delegate in the election for Public
  Health Officer.  M asks H to look into the safety issues of the
  proposed plan.

  H agrees to M's request.  He takes the lead in drafting the safety
  amendments for the plan.  Seeing this, many of the parents in the
  neighbourhood cast their votes for H.  These votes are numerous, and
  they ensure that safety concerns are going to feature prominently in
  the plan.

  The young planners have questions about the delivery of the sand, so
  they approach W.  W is a local building contractor who is always
  active in the election for Public Works Officer.  W explains that
  several types of sand are available from the City yards.  He says
  that delivery will depend on budgetary approval.  So they add "sand"
  to the budget section of their plan.

  Later, when it appears that a consensus is likely to form, M
  requests approval for the plan.  She does not speak directly to the
  City, rather she speaks to her own delegate - the person she is
  voting for in the Mayoral election.  In reply she receives a signed
  email from the Comptroller of the Parks Department, authorizing a
  preliminary safety inspection of the site.  M forwards the
  authorization to H, who arranges for the actual inspection.  When
  the inspector arrives, H guides her to the site... And so on.

  http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/47GTfRhVa6dOa0G7BXMxfp

Juho's concern (branchiness of the voting pattern) might be translated
to this context by considering clones M and M2.  They live in the same
neighbourhood; they have equal apparent ability, and both are
currently receiving the same number of votes.  What is likely to
happen?  In other words, how will competition affect the tree
structure?

I can only forsee that the voting pattern must provide effective lines
of communication.  It must connect local leaders (like M) into the
structure of power being delegated outward from the Mayor.  If the
whole does not mesh, then the leaders at all levels are going to be
thinking of making changes (M shifting her vote, the Mayor choosing
new lieutenants, and so on).  The detailed dynamics are unpredictable.
I can only imagine that any widespread restructuring will be
relatively rapid.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/