[Election-Methods] RELEASE: Instant Runoff Voting

[Terry Bouricius]

Different election methods provide different incentives to 
candidates...Under IRV, or two-round runoff, a candidate who is nobody's 
first choice cannot win (they will be eliminated) even if this candidate 
would be a good compromise (or merely an inoffensive candidate avoiding 
all controversial issues), whereas under Condorcet or Borda (for example) 
a candidate who is nobody's first choice CAN win. Thus IRV prompts 
candidates to "stand-out" enough to win a lot of FIRST choices and reach 
out for second choices as well, while that strategy of stressing first 
choices may hurt the candidate under Condorcet or Borda. IRV advocates 
argue (rightly, I think) that it strikes a favorable balance between 
seeking first choices ("core" support) and alternate rankings ("broad" 
support), when compared to methods that disregard whether a candidate 
received any first preferences.

Terry Bouricius

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Aaron Armitage" <eutychus_slept at yahoo.com>
To: <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Sunday, July 27, 2008 4:21 PM
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] RELEASE: Instant Runoff Voting





--- On Sun, 7/27/08, Terry Bouricius <terryb at burlingtontelecom.net> wrote:

> From: Terry Bouricius <terryb at burlingtontelecom.net>
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] RELEASE: Instant Runoff Voting
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Sunday, July 27, 2008, 2:26 PM
> While I agree that "core support" is not always
> well measured by first
> choices (multiple clones can make all these clones appear
> to have little
> "core" support, where any of them would appear to
> have massive core
> support running alone). However, I think the concept of
> "core support" is
> still an important factor in multi-candidate elections.
> While I think
> Condorcet methods are much better than most methods, I
> remain concerned
> that it may, in fact, reward inoffensive candidates who
> successfully hide
> their policy positions, rather than just true
> "compromise" candidates.
> Voters tend to have clear opinions of candidates at the top
> and bottom of
> their preference rankings, leaving the door open for
> inoffensive
> candidates who have avoided revealing any controversial
> views, to become
> EVERY voter's second choice ("at least he must be
> better than X") and
> likely Condorcet winner. The voting method will cause
> candidates to tailor
> their campaigns accordingly, and I fear Condorcet
> encourages candidates to
> limit voter information and instead campaign with slogans
> like "I am the
> candidate who listen to you" and policy will become
> even LESS discussed in
> campaigns than is already the case in the U.S.
>
> So an important caveat to the assertion that "if a
> majority prefers Brad
> over Carter, this preference exists whether the voting
> system does
> anything with it"...is that the voting method in use
> will affect candidate
> behavior, and thus may result in Brad NOT being actually
> preferred over
> Carter under a different voting method. In other words,
> voter preferences
> among candidates (whether scores, or rankings) are not
> actually "given,"
> as we assume when working out models (A>B>C), but
> will change depending on
> what campaign style is rewarded by the voting method in
> use.
>
> Terry Bouricius
>
>


I'm not sure this objection applies much more strongly to Condorcet 
methods than any other single-winner system; a candidate with any possible 
rough edges taken off will always have more appeal to moderates and 
low-information voters than one who takes clear policy positions. The 
closest thing to a real solution is to use proportional multi-winner 
elections wherever possible.



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