[Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV?

[Juho]

On Jul 12, 2008, at 1:11 , fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:

> Chris Benham replied:

>> This particular horrible idea would create a strong incentive
>> for the major power-brokers
>> to sponsor the nomination of a lot of fake candidates just to
>> collect votes for one or other
>> of the major parties.
>
> Am I mising something here?  I thought IRV was clone free.

I link this to the problems in Fiji http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Voting_system_of_Fiji. In some circumstances the voters don't seem to  
check where their votes will go.

> In conjunction with the candidate withdrawal option, it might  
> enable the (other) losing candidates to save the
> Condorcet candidate, or otherwise compensate for IRV's non- 
> monotonicity.

All actions that take place after the election are risky (withdrawal,  
votes as assets etc.). The problem is that these the actions of the  
candidates/parties may work against the interest of the voters, the  
decision power moves to few people only, and also strategic moves are  
easier after the vote counts are known. As a result some voters may  
be quite disappointed. (Maybe Chris Benham referred to these problems  
when talking about candidates commandeering the votes.)


There are many options for ballot completion and vote inheritance,  
e.g. voter determined order, candidate determined order and party  
determined order. The actual vote could be in some scenarios just a  
bullet vote. To simplify further the parties and subgroups could form  
a tree like structure. (One needs to plan a balance between the  
number of candidates, how complex the ballots can be, how many  
candidates the voters need to analyse and how complex inheritance  
structures the voters can follow (Fiji had problems here).)

Juho


>
>> And what do you have in mind as? "Australia's worst problems
>> with their version of IRV"?
>
> It has degenerated into a defacto second rate version of Asset Voting.
>
>>
>> Why do you want to "stop" IRV? Do you agree with Kathy Dopp?
>> that? IRV is worse than
>> FPP?
>
> I would stop IRV if we could get a better method in its place.
>
> If we cannot stop IRV, why not search for acceptable tweaks that  
> would improve it?
>
> It is better than FPP in some ways and worse in others, especially  
> in complexity.
>
> Do you think that Asset Voting is worse than FPP?
>
> Just to clarify, I think that Condorcet Methods and Range, though  
> better than IRV, share this complexity
> defect with IRV to some degree.  I have suggested the same tweak  
> for them.
>
> In fact, that is the essence of DYN, wihich is simply carrying this  
> tweak to its logical conclusion in the case
> of Range, which is the only one of the three (Range, Condorcet, and  
> IRV) that satisfies the FBC.
>
> This tweak works best for Range, because (in the case of Range) the  
> ballot that accomodate this tweak is
> of the extremely simple "Yes/No/Favorite" style.  The Favorite  
> category could easily be augmented to
> include Eppley's "Published Ballots" idea.
>
> Forest
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