[Election-Methods] A Better Version of IRV? (Terry Bouricius)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Terry,

--- En date de : Mer 9.7.08, Terry Bouricius 
> In 
> contrast to what your report claims to show, in fact, ALL
> bona fide voting 
> method experts agree that both Approval and IRV meet this
> Pareto 
> Improvement Criterion.

Actually, under Douglas Woodall's framework, it could be argued that
Approval fails Pareto. (Approval is considered a rank ballot method where
all ranked alternatives are approved and the truncated ones are
disapproved. So if every vote is x>y, the outcome is a tie.)

You don't have to use his scheme of course, but I would say that there
isn't much agreement on how to analyze Approval. The tricky thing is that
you don't want to analyze it in such a way that it satisfies Condorcet,
for instance.

Kevin Venzke


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