[Election-Methods] RE : Implausible DH3 argument at Range Voting website
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Jan 1 16:23:39 PST 2008
--- Steve Eppley <SEppley at alumni.caltech.edu> a écrit :
> Several months ago, a critic of Condorcetian voting methods referred me
> to a webpage at the Range Voting website
> <http://rangevoting.org/DH3.html>. Here's an excerpt:
Another page to look at is
Here there is a scenario with three roughly equal, non-aligned candidates
A, B, and C, with one turkey candidate D. One faction independently raising
D accomplishes nothing. Only if two factions align (inexplicably, given
what we are told of their preferences), can D be given a victory over the
third faction. But in that case the two factions are a majority and do not
have to resort to dirty tricks.
The page contends that in any case this strategy would be "extremely
common" because even if voters didn't understand the method (and could not
receive advice from candidates or parties, I guess), burial strategy "is a
natural attempt to most-hurt their candidates' perceived major rivals." In
other words he is not blaming Condorcet strategy incentives, but the
inevitable incompetence of the voters.
In that case I wonder why this phenomenon isn't a problem under Range
voting? Is it because as long as I rate all the unwanted candidates
sufficiently low, Range won't really note the distinction?
Astonishingly the page claims DH3 isn't a problem when there are only two
major rivals. As far as I remember, on the EM list burial is *primarily*
discussed in the context of there being two major rivals, with one weak
candidate. One wonders if Warren is unaware of those issues.
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