[EM] Continuous elections and their interplay with power structures

[Juho]

There is a difference between methods where only voters can modify  
their votes at any time and methods where the candidate that got some  
votes can redirect these votes. The latter case may cause larger and  
faster changes. And such changes may lead to reactions also among  
those voters that gave their vote to this person (if the voters do  
not like the change). These properties may mean higher instability.

Juho


On Aug 19, 2008, at 19:39 , Michael Allan wrote:

> Juho wrote (in thread PRfavoringracialminorities):
>> Possible interest to have stable governments that live from one
>> (traditional) election to the next may be seen as a factor that talks
>> against continuous elections. On the other hand also governments  
>> could be
>> flexible. They could include new parties in the government if the  
>> support
>> of the old government parties gets too small.
>
> I just posted a question along these lines, in APSA_ITP.  I wasn't
> concerned that power structures would be de-stabilized by continuous
> elections, at least not in mid-term - I argue to the contrary.  But my
> question concerned the dynamics of power shifts that occur *between*
> terms.  Here's a copy of the post, in case anyone else is interested
> in the question.
>
> ===== quote, with a minor corrections, from =====
> http://lists.hmdc.harvard.edu/lists/ 
> apsa_itp_at_lists_hmdc_harvard_edu/2008_08/msg00011.html
>
> I have a question on my mind.  It has to do with the possibility of
> independent elections in the public sphere.  May I throw the question
> open to the list?  It arises from this little story (refs at bottom):
>
>    The young people in a certain neighbourhood wish to make
>    improvements to their playground or park.  They come up with a plan
>    and begin to promote it locally.  Some of them are in disagreement
>    and propose alternative plans.  They all share access to a new kind
>    of electoral medium.  They use the medium to highlight their
>    differences and to resolve them one by one.  Eventually they reach
>    a general agreement on a consensus plan.  The City sends a safety
>    inspector to the site, and trucks in some sand.  With a little
>    help, the young people complete the improvements to the park.
>
> Just so, that's the complete outline.  I'll introduce a few other
> characters in a moment.  They have an important role to play behind
> the scenes.  Their role is not only to decide on plans and policies
> (norms), but also on candidates for office (power).  The same
> electoral medium is used for both decision types.  But it's the latter
> type I have a question about.  It relates to this tree-like structure
> of voting (to see it, you will need a fixed-width font):
>
>
>                         (I)  (K)  (L)
>                           \ 1 | 1 /
>                            \  |  / 1    (A)   (B)
>                   (P)  (O)  \ | /        | 1  /
>          (R)        \ 1 |    \|/         |   / 1
>            \ 1       \  | 1  (M)         |  /
>             \         \ |     |          | /  (E)  (F)
>              \         \|     | 4        |/    | 1 /
>           1   \        (Q)    |         (C)    |  / 1
>       (S)-----(T)        \ 3  |          |     | /
>                 \ 3       \   |          | 3   |/
>                  \         \  |          |    (H)-----(G)
>                   \         \ |    (D)   |    /     1
>        1       2   \         \|      \ 1 |   /
>    (U)-----(V)-----(W)       (N)      \  |  / 4
>                      \ 6     /         \ | /
>                       \     / 8         \|/
>                        \   /            (J)
>                         \ /
>                         (X)              8
>                                         ---
>                          14
>                         ----
>
>    FIG 1.  Delegate cascade voting.  A snapshot of a small election in
>    which two separate cascades have formed.  Vote flow is depicted by
>    lines (downward), and volume by numbers.  The votes flow together
>    until they pool at the bottom, where they are held by the leading
>    candidates.
>
>    PNG image:  http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade.png
>
>
> This is a snapshot image, it covers only a single moment in time.  The
> actual election is continuous, never ending, and the votes are free to
> shift.  So M (center top) may shift her vote to C.  And 'I' may
> respond by shifting hers to Q.  And so on... The structure of the tree
> is dynamic, not fixed.  It models the structure of *opinion*, and will
> therefore fluctuate as people change their minds.
>
> A tree can model other social structures, aside from public opinion.
> Flip it upside down, and it takes on the appearance of an organization
> chart.  That could be the Mayor at bottom (X), and her two lieutenants
> (W and N).  In this view, the tree is modelling the structure of
> *power*.  These two views will come together, as the story continues.
>
>    Mae is a community leader in the neighbourhood.  She is also a
>    local delegate in the public election for Mayor.  When she learns
>    of the plans to improve the park she takes an interest.
>
>    Mae speaks to Hal.  Hal is a local delegate in the election for
>    Public Health Officer.  Mae asks Hal to look into the safety issues
>    of the proposed plan.  Hal agrees.  He takes a lead role in
>    drafting a set of safety amendments for the plan.  His amendments
>    attract the votes of many parents in the neighbourhood.  The votes
>    are numerous enough to ensure that safety concerns are going to
>    feature prominently in the plan.
>
>    The young planners have a question about the delivery of the sand,
>    so they approach Wen.  Wen is a local building contractor and a
>    delegate for the Public Works Office.  Wen explains that several
>    types of sand are available from the City yards.  He says that
>    delivery will depend on budgetary approval.  So they add "sand" to
>    the Budget section of their plan.
>
>    Later, when it appears that a consensus is likely to form, Mae
>    requests approval for the plan.  She does not speak directly to
>    City Hall, rather she speaks to her own delegate - the person she
>    is voting for in the Mayoral election.  In reply she receives a
>    signed email from the Comptroller of the Parks Department,
>    authorizing a preliminary safety inspection of the site.  Mae
>    forwards the authorization to Hal, who arranges for the actual
>    inspection.  When the safety inspector arrives, Hal guides her to
>    the site... And so on.
>
> Recalling the tree images, we can clearly see a rationale for aligning
> vote flow to the structure of power.  Mae's vote has opened a
> communication channel to City Hall.  She uses that channel to
> coordinate her *local* leadership with the resources and power of
> *central* government.  Her success in getting things done around the
> neighbourhood attracts votes, which she uses in turn as leverage to
> keep the channel open.
>
> By the same token, we can understand how the distribution of power
> from the center will align with the inward flow of votes.  From the
> Mayor's point of view, the electoral backing of the central delegates
> (W and N) is a strong argument to back-delegate a share of power to
> them.  And so on - the imperative is recursive - the central delegates
> too must back-delegate their power in line with their own electoral
> support (following the rule of patronage, "you dance with them that
> brought you").
>
> The combined effect is one of mutual reinforcement: from both sides,
> vote flow and power flow are going to crystallize into a single whole.
> Its stability will defy internal tensions.  Delegate M might not
> *like* having X as Mayor, but she will think twice about shifting her
> vote and losing her communication with City Hall.  By the same token,
> the Mayor might not *like* sharing power with her lieutenant N, but
> she will think twice about dismissing her from office and losing her
> votes.
>
>    Q. Given the stability of this combined structure, how will it
>       accommodate a power shift?
>
> That's the question that has me puzzled.  For example, suppose the
> Mayor's term is coming to an end.  An election day has been fixed for
> some point in the future, and this impending fact begins to undermine
> the attractions of the power structure.  The glue starts to dissolve.
> The delegates become free to shift their votes, and to seek a new
> consensus.  But how exactly will they do this?
>
> (1).  Will W, N and the other central delegates (not shown) confer
> together, and reach an agreement amongst themselves, like Cardinals?
> Presumeably they could then shift their votes in unison to the
> consensus candidate.  But what happens if they choose wrong?  What if
> their own backing melts away, as a consequence?
>
> (2).  If L dissents from the consensus, then she would find a ready
> alternative in J.  She might support J by shifting her vote to C.
> Does this mean that a shadow power structure would have a role to play
> as a lightning rod for dissent, and as a government in waiting?  Might
> that role become institutionalized as a kind of party system, one
> party in power (X), and the other awaiting a turn (J)?
>
> Can anyone see a third way for power to shift?
> -- 
> Michael Allan
>
> Toronto, 647-436-4521
> http://zelea.com/
>
>
> The electoral medium is documented at:
>
>    http://zelea.com/project/votorola/home.xht
>
> The scenario of park improvement was originally introduced and
> discussed in the context of citizen vs. consumer relations, in these
> threads:
>
>    http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/2ma78lpfH1ZqdOZv2k7R6j
>    http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/6VbcCacxpBG6tkOSrpIf9y
>
> ----
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