[EM] [Election-Methods] [english 94%] PR favoring racialminorities

[Juho]

On Aug 16, 2008, at 17:15 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

>> I could see a kind of proxy front end to STV elections. I'm not  
>> sure I'm convinced it would be a good idea, or even practical to  
>> implement, but suppose that any person or group (including  
>> parties) could register an STV ranking, and a voter could select  
>> that ranking instead of ranking individual candidates. The  
>> logistical difficulty would be in determining how a voter  
>> specified their proxy, along with the possibility of ambiguity  
>> deliberate or accidental ("Siera Club", "John Smith").
> There's another difficulty with that idea, and one that Juho has  
> shown earlier, as related to the inheritance order of candidates in  
> the electoral system of Fiji. Candidates may put preferences in  
> different orders than you do, or come to an agreement with other  
> candidates to support each other.
>
> To some extent, that could be fixed by publishing the ranking  
> beforehand, but one should still be aware of the difficulty.
>
>
>
> I think that the simplest way of adding proxying to STV, user  
> interface wise, would be to have a delegation mark, where your  
> stated preference ordering overrides that of the candidate. For  
> instance
>
> A > B* > C (rest left blank)
> with * as the delegation mark, and B having the preference ordering  
> B > E > F > C, would give
>
> A > B > E > F > C

This vote could be alternatively interpreted as A > B > C > E > F.

>
> by substitution, whereas
>
> A > C > B*
>
> would give
>
> A > C > B > E > F
>
> since the A > C preference that the voter manually stated overrode  
> the F > C preference of candidate B.
>
> Paradoxical preferences could be resolved by highest ranked first. If
>
> A > B* > C*
>
> and B prefers D to E, but C prefers E to D, then the final ordering  
> prefers D to E since B is ranked above C. An even more  
> sophisticated version could run a single-winner social order  
> election for equal-ranked candidates, so that
>
> A > B* = C*
>
> gives A > (result of social ordering, according to single-winner  
> method, for those candidates for which B and C gave any preference)

On the other side, a simple version of default or explicitly  
indicated vote completing preference order would be to use the tree  
structure (and only one star (maybe use first or last listed  
candidate by default) to indicate which branch of the tree to use).

Juho


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