[EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Kathy Dopp
kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Tue Aug 12 21:01:40 PDT 2008
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 18:17:49 -0700
> From: "rob brown" <rob at karmatics.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
> The "two strikes you are out" rule is not inherent to machine voting -- that
> is fixable, obviously.
How? Do we want an infinite loop of a voter running paper through a
cheap printer trying to obtain an accurate ballot record and the
machine refusing to print one while it switches a vote wrongly? Or do
we want the voter to be able to cancel the ballot and let the poll
workers know that he needs a paper ballot instead that he can mark
himself? If so, why not let the voters vote on a paper ballot to
begin with?
Any ideas?
>
> Regardless, are you suggesting that a programmer could steal an election by
> just hoping that that every one of the people who had it fail twice in a row
> is going to simply say "oh well" and go home, rather than raise holy hell
> about it?
No. Obviously it is trivially easy for any programmer of a voting machine to:
a. make the printed ballot record match an erroneous e-ballot record
on the voters first try
b. in the 10% of cases when a voter notices the error on the paper
ballot and cancels the ballot, the programmer than makes the paper
printout and the electronic record match exactly what the voter wants.
Recall that I said that the programmer would only be able to switch up
to 90% of the target votes without any audit able to detect it.
The voter would either think that he must have made a mistake on the
first try, or complain about his vote being switched.
We have already seen hundreds or thousands or cases of voters in the
last two election cycles complaining that their votes have been
switched to the wrong candidates with DREs and election officials have
mostly ignored the problem or chalked it up to "touchscreen
callibration" problems (which does cause similar behavior)
>
> As a programmer myself, I can tell you that any non-stupid (but evil)
> programmer would have it do it correctly the second time....I mean, you know
> they are looking that time, so why push your luck for one vote? So the "2
> strikes and you're out", silly as it may be, is hardly the issue.
Huh?
I mentioned TWO SEPARATE ISSUES:
1. the programming hack that can switch 90% of target votes without
audits being able to detect it.
2. the 2 strikes you're out rule that *all* DREs currently use today
that prevents even the 10% of diligent voters who detect errors in
their paper printed records from being able to generate a correct
machine-printed paper ballot record.
If you prefer not have *any* paper ballot record, then ofcourse there
is no way to check the accuracy of the machine counts independent of
the programming.
>
> I can also tell you that much of the issue here is far out of the field of
> computer science, and is more in the area of sociology/psychology with a
> little game theory and economics thrown in.
Really? OK, but *all* independent computer scientists (that I know)
oppose the use of e-ballot voting systems for very solid logically
correct reasons.
It is true that e-ballots with machine printed paper records *might*
work (although still expensive and subject to DOS attacks) *IF* you
could train all voters and election officials and poll workers
adequately how to handle doing elections with them, but that seems
like a very remote possibility unless you want to begin lessons in how
to use e-ballot paper trail voting systems in grammar school as a
course and have paper ballots as backup available in every polling
location and train pollworkers and voters to recognize when the
machines look like vote fraud may be going on, etc. Human factors
must be considered realistically.
>
> I don't disagree that there are problems with machine voting, some easier to
> fix than others. (a paper trail is an absolute necessity, for instance, as
> is open source code)
Again, virtually all *independent* computer scientists who are voting
system experts disagree with you and believe that voter-marked paper
ballots are essential and that "paper trails" are inadequate as I've
tried to explain some of their flaws here.
> Still I think you are blowing things out of
> proportion -- to a large enough degree that your propoganda has pulled me
> out of my typical lurk mode on the list.
Well using words like "propaganda" and "blowing things out of
proportion" are very skillful ways to try to discount real facts, but
do not impress me, or most people as much as concrete facts do.
>
>
>> Shamos is considered a rogue among computer scientists and I am fairly
>> certain that Shamos does not have any degree in computer science, as
>> is true of most "experts" who support DREs.
>>
>
> And I am fairly certain that you didn't spend two minutes researching, as
> you'd have easily found that he does indeed have a phD in computer science
> from Yale. Which gives me one more reason to suspect the facts you
> present. (don't take this as an endorsement of what Shamos says, just a
> reaction to your logically and factually unsound propaganda)
OK. I am mistaken on that point then. Thank you for correcting me.
It still remains true though, that Michael Shamos is considered a
rogue computer scientist and that Michael Shamos financially profits
handsomely by certifying DRE voting systems for the state of PA which
can not be shown to be inaccurate since they are paperless and there
is no software independent method to audit their output.
Again, I know of *no* PhD computer scientist who does not profit from
VVV who supports e-ballot voting machines.
Cheers,
Kathy
>
> -rob
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20080812/6455dfc1/attachment-0001.htm>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 22:53:13 -0400
> From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
> Cc: Range Voting <RangeVoting at yahoogroups.com>, kathy.dopp at gmail.com,
> election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Message-ID: <48A24C99.7020302 at clarityconnect.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
>
> On Tue, 12 Aug 2008 17:47:05 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>>Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 01:16:29 -0400
>>>From: Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>
>>>Subject: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
>>
>>
>>> Responses concentrate on fact that present DREs and paper
>>>ballots have problems, and do not consider fixing the DREs.
>>
>>
>> As virtually all (all I know) independent computer scientists (who do
>> not profit from certifying or working for VVV's - vulture voting
>> vendors) agree, it is *not* possible to "fix" DREs because their
>> fundamental design is flawed. I.e. Any machine cast or machine printed
>> record of ballots is not going to work.
>
> "fundamental design is flawed"? If so, obvious response is to redo
> the design.
>>
>> The flaws of DRE paper roll ballot printers include (there is a much
>> longer list):
>>
>> Studies show that fewer than 30% of voters check machine-printed paper
>> ballot roll records and fewer than 30% of voters who check (or about
>> 10% of all voters) accurately proofread their machine-printed paper
>> ballot roll records to detect any errors, so that a programmer can
>> switch up to 90% of available target votes in a way that no audit can
>> detect.
>
> I do not see how an auditor could know of and tailor the audit to the
> particular ballots the programmer did not switch.
>
>> Also there is a "two strikes and you are out" rule that
>> prevents the most diligent voter from having a machine-printed paper
>> ballot record that matches the voter's choices. A voter can only
>> cancel ballot casting twice due to an incorrect printed paper roll
>> record. On the third try, the voter receives an error message on the
>> screen warning that the voter has only one more chance to cast their
>> ballot. On the third try, the paper roll ballot record whizzes
>> quickly inside the canister WITHOUT GIVING THE VOTER A CHANCE TO SEE
>> THE PAPER RECORD!
>>
> What does it matter? How come the redesign failed to attend to
> properly recording the vote?
>> --
>>
>> Any machine-printed paper ballot record will have the same flaws, and
>> electronic video, audio, or pictorial verification systems are even
>> worse.
>
> Huh? There seems to be general agreement that present DREs need
> replacing. I only ask that we try for usable replacements.
>
> I also cannot get excited over the machine-printing you mention -
> proper equipment should work correctly and not need such (except,
> perhaps, to please nervous voters).
>>
>> Shamos is considered a rogue among computer scientists and I am fairly
>> certain that Shamos does not have any degree in computer science, as
>> is true of most "experts" who support DREs.
>>
>> The persons who rebutted Shamos' articles *do* have formal training
>> and degrees in computer science.
>
> Crane's paper does not explicitly mention Shamos or its authors having
> such a degree - it does mention involvement in voting.
>
> For one Crane author, Edward Cherlin, I read of working on affordable
> software and hardware for voting around the world.
> Hopefully he is intending such to be adequate.
>
> Do not know if such a degree was available when I was in college -
> could not have learned much presently usable. Remember a tidbit about
> weather forecasting. Could give a computer data to predict for
> tomorrow - by the time program was done you could look out the window
> and see if it got it right.
> Remember a problem later at work - too much data for Fortran to
> fit in available memory. Heard of a new language - Jovial. Available
> staff was engineers who could hardly spell "program" and assembly
> programmers who could hardly spell "compiler". I successfully
> installed compiler and taught staff for project to use.
> Later - task could not execute in available time - invented new,
> faster, instructions then used in available computers.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Kathy
> --
> davek at clarityconnect.com people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
> Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
> Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
> If you want peace, work for justice.
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 21:34:56 -0600
> From: "Kathy Dopp" <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
> To: "Dave Ketchum" <davek at clarityconnect.com>
> Cc: Range Voting <RangeVoting at yahoogroups.com>,
> election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Message-ID:
> <391f105b0808122034i26e9dbdbnd11189087d83759e at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
>> "fundamental design is flawed"? If so, obvious response is to redo the
>> design.
>
> Hi David,
>
> The only "design" that is *not* flawed (that I know of) is
> voter-marked paper ballots because it provides voter-verifiED ballots.
>
> However the optical scanning machines that count them today are very
> flawed and use no modern security, encryption, or open standard data
> formats that have been available for many years. They're your basic
> cheap junk, but far superior to today's basic cheap e-ballot junk.
>
>>>
>>> The flaws of DRE paper roll ballot printers include (there is a much
>>> longer list):
>>>
>>> Studies show that fewer than 30% of voters check machine-printed paper
>>> ballot roll records and fewer than 30% of voters who check (or about
>>> 10% of all voters) accurately proofread their machine-printed paper
>>> ballot roll records to detect any errors, so that a programmer can
>>> switch up to 90% of available target votes in a way that no audit can
>>> detect.
>>
>> I do not see how an auditor could know of and tailor the audit to the
>> particular ballots the programmer did not switch.
>
> Huh!? I said: "so that a **programmer** can switch up to 90% of
> available target votes in a way that no audit can detect."
>
> Valid audits require manually counting ballots of randomly selected
> reported unofficial vote counts.
>
> The problem is that because only 10% of voters may accurately check
> machine-printed paper ballot records, ALL MACHINE PRINTED ballots will
> match erroneous electronic vote totals because 90% of the
> machine-printed paper ballots can be printed to match erroneous
> electronic touchscreen ballot records, and the voters would not notice
> it; and no audit can detect the fraud.
>
> Voters *could* detect the fraud, but the 10% of voters who notice that
> their first ballot did not match their choices and cancels their first
> ballot, may think that they made a mistake rather than the machine
> when the second time they try to cast their ballot after canceling it
> on the first try when they notice the erroneous paper ballot, their
> paper ballot then *does* match their choices. As I said, 10% of the
> ballots can *not* be switched by the programmer (only 90% of target
> paper ballots and their e-ballots can be switched by the programmer),
> but ALL the printed ballots will match the erroneous e-ballot totals.
>
> This particular DRE hack was published back around May 2005 in the
> Brennan Center Report "The Machinery of Democracy" and is why
> virtually all (everyone I know and I have written papers with dozens
> of PhD computer scientists on voting system topics) computer
> scientists oppose using e-ballot voting systems with machine-printed
> paper ballot records.
>
>>
>>> Also there is a "two strikes and you are out" rule that
>>> prevents the most diligent voter from having a machine-printed paper
>>> ballot record that matches the voter's choices. A voter can only
>>> cancel ballot casting twice due to an incorrect printed paper roll
>>> record. On the third try, the voter receives an error message on the
>>> screen warning that the voter has only one more chance to cast their
>>> ballot. On the third try, the paper roll ballot record whizzes
>>> quickly inside the canister WITHOUT GIVING THE VOTER A CHANCE TO SEE
>>> THE PAPER RECORD!
>>>
>> What does it matter? How come the redesign failed to attend to properly
>> recording the vote?
>
> I do not get your question. If you want to know more about this
> particular "Two Strikes You're Out" flaw of DRE-printed paper ballot
> records, either:
>
> 1. If you personally vote on a DRE, try cancelling your ballot twice
> and then see what happens when you cast your ballot on the third try.
> (Take a picture of the warning screen with your cell phone before
> pushing the button, and then watch the ballot quickly roll up before
> you can see what is on it.)
>
> or
>
> 2. Read the NJ Institute of Technology studies of DRE printers which
> caused NJ to refuse to certify any of the DRE paper printers.
>
> Without a limit on the number of times a voter can try to print a
> matching paper ballot record, and without a way for the voter to bail
> out of casting a vote on a DRE which refuses to create an accurate
> paper ballot record, then obviously there would be other problems,
> like running out of paper in the paper rolls (poll workers frequently
> have problems loading the paper, load it backwards so it does not
> print, and the papers frequently jam while printing, or keep the
> covers closed so voters don't see the paper ballot records, or voters
> can easily sabotage the paper so that it appears to work during the
> elections but all the records are erased at the end of the election.
> (See the CA SoS study of voting systems.)
>
> Sigh, so the FLAW is the inanity and expense and hassle of trying to
> keep a printer running in every polling booth during elections rather
> than using a less costly paper ballot, and more importantly the fact
> that the machine, rather than the voter is marking the paper ballot
> record.
>
> Fix that cannot be done without switching to voter marked optical scan
> paper ballots.
>
>>
>> Huh? There seems to be general agreement that present DREs need replacing.
>> I only ask that we try for usable replacements.
>
> Over 60% of US election jurisdictions already implemented "usable
> replacements" - the optical scan paper ballot system.
>
>> Crane's paper does not explicitly mention Shamos or its authors having such
>> a degree - it does mention involvement in voting.
>
> Not surprising.
>
> ANY SYSTEM can be assumed to be inaccurate if it lacks a routine
> method for detecting and correcting errors that is independent of the
> software. Since voting is much more difficult to secure than banking
> due to the secret ballot, the only method of providing software
> independence is a paper ballot.
>
> You certainly would not expect me to deposit my vote anonymously
> without a receipt into a bank, so why would anyone want me to use such
> an insane method for voting which would make it trivially easy for any
> insider to alter the election outcomes undetectably?
>
>>
>> For one Crane author, Edward Cherlin, I read of working on affordable
>> software and hardware for voting around the world.
>> Hopefully he is intending such to be adequate.
>
> Many good folks are working on affordable, open source optical scan
> voting equipment because most of today's optical scanners are also
> hackable junk.
>
> As Ion Sancho of Florida said (paraphrased), "It will take a long time
> to fix our voting systems, in the meantime we need to push for
> AUDITS."
>
>>
>> Do not know if such a degree was available when I was in college -
>
> How long ago were you in college? Computer science degrees have been
> around since atleast 1969 and I believe long before then. That's when
> I took my first computer science course. I have a couple of friends
> who learned to program when they had to hard wire computers to program
> them.
>
>
>> could not
>> have learned much presently usable.
>
> I first programmed with punch-cards.
>
>> Remember a tidbit about weather
>> forecasting. Could give a computer data to predict for tomorrow - by the
>> time program was done you could look out the window and see if it got it
>> right.
>
> :-) Well that used to be true, but weather prediction programs are
> much more sophisticated and faster nowadays.
>
>> Remember a problem later at work - too much data for Fortran to fit in
>> available memory.
>
> It is easy to overrun computer memory with data and programming
> instructions, depending on the application and the skill (or lack of
> it) of the programmer. I would imagine that the new weather programs
> take a huge amount of memory to run.
>
>> Heard of a new language - Jovial. Available staff was
>> engineers who could hardly spell "program" and assembly programmers who
>> could hardly spell "compiler". I successfully installed compiler and taught
>> staff for project to use.
>> Later - task could not execute in available time - invented new, faster,
>> instructions then used in available computers.
>
> Yes, well the Internet was invented so that various researchers could
> use others' faster computers at different locations to run
> long-running programs.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Kathy
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Election-Methods mailing list
> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>
>
> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 50, Issue 15
> ************************************************
>
--
Kathy Dopp
The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author
Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a
Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in
exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at
P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657
http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org
How to Audit Election Outcome Accuracy
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/legislative/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf
History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf
Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list