[Election-Methods] strategic voting and strategic nomination

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

> So, to sum up, speaking very, very roughly,
> for strategic voting: IRV > runoffs > minimax > plurality >> approval > 
> Borda > range
> for strategic nomination: approval, range >> minimax >> IRV > runoffs > 
> Borda (varies) > plurality

That's interesting, because optimal strategizing in IRV has been found 
to be NP-complete ("The Computational Difficulty of Manipulating an 
Election"). So, in a sense, your simulations reflect this (and that IRV 
strategy is closer to the difficult part/phase transition of the 
NP-complete domain; that is, it's not just the easy instances).

I don't remember clearly, but I think they showed that any such systems 
where optimal manipulation is NP-hard must be nonmonotonic, however. 
That is, they used a manipulation algorithm they said would work if the 
system was "monotonic and responsive" - I don't remember what 
"responsive" meant.