[Election-Methods] [Election Methods] Re: 3-slot ICA fixed to meet 2-candidate Condorcet?

[Chris Benham]

Maybe more exact is:

"3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as
approval. 

If any there are any candidates whose Top ratings score is higher than his 
or her maximum pairwise opposition score, elect the one of these with the
highest TR score.

Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner."


Chris Benham



Chris Benham wrote (Apr.28):

Kevin,
Your  "Improved Condorcet//Approval" (ICA) method I take attempts
to minimally modify Condorcet//Approval(ranking) so that it meets
Sincere Favourite (your version of  FBC).


http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica


http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critsf


48: A>B
02: B
49: B=A
01: C

A>B 48-2,  A>C 97-1.

In this virtual 2-candidate election, ICA elects B.

To fix this, I suggest: 

"3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as
approval. 

If the Top ratings winner T has a TR score higher than T's
maximum pairwise opposition score then elect T.

Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner."


This seems to be a pure improvement. What do you think?


Chris  Benham


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