[Election-Methods] [Election Methods] 3-slot ICA fixed to meet 2-candidate Condorcet?

[Chris Benham]

Kevin,
Your  "Improved Condorcet//Approval" (ICA) method I take attempts
to minimally modify Condorcet//Approval(ranking) so that it meets
Sincere Favourite (your version of  FBC).

 
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica


http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critsf


48: A>B
02: B
49: B=A
01: C

A>B 48-2,  A>C 97-1.

In this virtual 2-candidate election, ICA elects B.

To fix this, I suggest: 

"3-slot ballots, default rating Bottom, Top and Middle interpreted as
approval. 

If the Top ratings winner T has a TR score higher than T's
maximum pairwise opposition score then elect T.

Otherwise elect the regular ICA winner."


This seems to be a pure improvement. What do you think?


Chris  Benham


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