[Election-Methods] Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

[Diego Santos]

There were many discussions in this mailing list about advantages of winning
votes as counterstrategy against order reversal. But sometimes truncation is
risky. Consider this example:

46: A > B > C
44: C > B > A
10: B > A > C

B is CW.

Offensive strategy by A voters:

46: A > C > B
44: C > B > A
10: B > A > C

A wins under RP(wv) or margins.

If truncation would be used:

46: A > C > B
44: C > B > A
10: B

C, the sincere Condorcet loser, wins.

Winning votes induces truncation. Voters should feel free to express
complete preferences.

I was thinking in something similiar to "automatic truncation", i. e.,
pairwise stregth in ranked pairs should be measured by plurality. If
approval is used, the method becames DMC. Maybe approval cutoffs are not
needed, then RP(plurality) is sufficient.

RP (plurality)  or pairwise sorted plurality offers weak burial resistance
and is summable, opposite to Smith,IRV.

Diego Santos
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