[Election-Methods] RE : Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Tue Jul 31 16:27:58 PDT 2007


At 04:11 PM 7/31/2007, Juho wrote:
>I'm still wondering if you felt that D was the rightful
>winner in the basic example where sincere opinions were 1000 A>B,
>1000 C>D, 1 D>B (or 1000 A>B>C=D, 1000 C>D>A=B, 1 D>B>A=B).

I'm not getting into the main discussion here, but wanted to answer 
the question implied.

There is no rightful winner in the situation described. There is only 
a rightful winner, properly, when a majority have expressed consent 
to that choice. We often infer this from votes, but, here, there is 
no adequate information, so I'd consider this a failed election. Both 
A and C fell short of a majority, and D>B does not indicate 
acceptance of D, but only rejection of B in comparison.

I would resolve it by assigning 1000 votes to A, 1000 votes to C, 1 
vote to D, and putting them in a room and not giving them food or 
water until they agree. If they could not agree within necessary time 
limits, I'd hold the election again. I'd be tempted to disqualify A 
and C, but.... they did have 1000 supporters each.

And the new election would be plurality with the two candidates.

Just joking about the food and water part. Sort of. 




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