[Election-Methods] Corrected "strategy in Condorcet" section

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 05:35 PM 7/30/2007, Juho wrote:

>Yes, a more detailed analysis should not rely on one axis only.

I'm not sure how many Warren's simulations use, but the simulator 
doesn't just do even random distributions, which are unrealistic, 
though interesting.


>The additional (utility/preference strength related) information that
>range style ballots provide is excellent information. The only
>problem is that we don't have a voting method that would both take
>that information properly into account and be resistant to strategic
>voting at the same time.

I've suggested one. Why not consider it?

>Condorcet votes are relatively expressive (less than Range but more
>than most) and at the same time they are relatively resistant to
>strategic voting. That's why they are interesting and why they may be
>a good or the optimal method for many uses.

Problem is, they can make spectacularly bad decisions with people 
voting sincerely! It's inherent in the Codorcet Criterion, which 
utterly neglects preference strength, turning a fly's weight of 
preference into something equivalent to life or death. (I.e., both 
preferences are considered equally.)

Range is an excellent method for use in small groups as a poll, to 
suggest a nominee. You wouldn't use Condorcet for that, not if you 
know what is good for your group! You are going to ratify the result 
anyway, small groups have the luxury of that, so the result *must*, 
with good procedure, satisfy the *ultimate* Condorcet Criterion.

The Condorcet Criterion is problematic also because it can award 
victory based on a small percentage of the electorate, the Majority 
Criterion is much stronger. It's advisable, in my opinion, to never 
award elections based on a plurality, period. The safest way to do it 
is with a ratification, and we we really start to design election 
methods both for efficiency and accuracy, we'll consider that.


>Theoretically, in a two party system the opinions of the two parties
>should change in time so that the average voter opinion would lie
>approximately between the two parties.

Median, not average.... That's the theory. However, it can go 
spectacularly wrong.