[Election-Methods] [EM] RV comments

[Juho]

On Jul 29, 2007, at 21:17 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 01:51 AM 7/29/2007, Juho wrote:
>> On Jul 22, 2007, at 6:58 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>
>> > At 08:17 AM 7/21/2007, Juho wrote:
>> >> I also think that Range is a good method in non-contentions  
>> polls and
>> >> elections. But in the statement above a competitive election  
>> was of
>> >> course the assumption.
>> >
>> > Why?
>> >
>> > *Assumptions should be stated.* Election methods are used in all
>> > kinds of situations. If there is an ideal election method for use
>> > where it would be expected that people will vote sincerely,
>> > shouldn't we know it?
>>
>> Yes, it is good to state the assumptions. I however do assume
>> election scenarios to be competitive unless other assumptions are
>> explicitly stated. Especially with Range it makes a big difference to
>> me if one plans to use it in a non-competitive or competitive set-up.
>
> Let me point to something a little deeper. "Non-competitive" means  
> what? I'd take it as meaning that the electorate wants to  
> cooperate, to find the best solution for all, and it is assumed  
> that it is not a zero-sum game. It is often not necessary that  
> *anyone* "lose."

One possible definition of non-competitiveness is that voters  
strongly want such an alternative to win that the society considers  
best, not the one that they personally consider best. Practical  
examples on elections that may be non-competitive are voting on which  
cloud on the sky is the prettiest, or voting on which flavour of ice  
cream is the best flavour (everyone will buy their preferred flavour  
after the election, they are thus not forced to buy and eat the  
winning flavour ice cream), or what movie is the best ever (I believe  
www.imdb.com has used some Range like method).

>
> In "competitive" elections, there are winners and losers. While the  
> game may not be zero-sum, it tends toward it, so voters are  
> polarized. Which group will get its way, which group will lose and  
> be disappointed?
>
> By limiting ourselves to "competitive elections," we are limiting  
> ourselves, actually, to dysfunctional societies. We need to know that.

You are quite ambitious. Making the societies non-competitive is a  
huge task. The market economy is for example currently strongly based  
on competition (harnessing competition to provide good results for all).

And we don't need to go any further than to this mailing list to see  
strong competitive attitudes (on e.g. which method is best).

>
> And there is a conclusion we can make. If we care about improving  
> the function of society, we should worry that an election method  
> that works beautifully in a dysfunctional society might actually  
> inhibit a return to function. If the election method encourages  
> polarization and competition, it may prevent the society from healing.
>
> So, I'd suggest, we should incline toward election methods that  
> will make good choices in a cooperative environment, and that will  
> not make bad ones in a competitive environment. It's possible that  
> the ideal election method is not so good in the competitive  
> environment, but if it produces better results when people  
> cooperate toward the common welfare, it is superior to a method  
> maximized toward function under conditions of competition.

I think Warren Schudy already pointed out that there is a risk that  
changing the voting method with good intentions may in some cases  
lead to worse results, not better. The equation is of course complex  
(and changes in the spirit of the society are often (but not  
necessarily) slow).

>
> However, it looks like we have methods that work best in a  
> cooperative environment -- and Majority Criterion and Condorcet  
> Criterion methods can spectacularly fail in this -- and that still  
> perform as well, approximately, as the best "competitive" methods.  
> Range is a candidate for this, and Range with runoffs under certain  
> specified conditions is, arguably, even better.

As discussed many times the strategy problems of Range may be too bad  
to be overcome. We should keep seeking for better methods all the  
time of course.

>
> In a cooperative environment, where we may assume a much higher  
> percentage of sincere votes, the Range winner is optimal (though  
> there is even then, because of the normalization problem, better  
> result from Range+2), and the runoff rules might even eventually be  
> discarded, perhaps to be triggered again if signs appear of serious  
> competition.
>
> In a competitive environment, the runoff rules guarantee what I  
> consider the bare minimum of democracy, which is majority consent.
>
> So let's be careful!
>
>> > And *then* we could look at what happens when some people don't
>> > vote sincerely? It's clear that there is harm done, under some
>> > circumstances, but how much harm and who is harmed the most? Is it
>> > the sincere voters? Or is it those who did not provide accurate
>> > information to the voting method, so it can't possibly optimize
>> > their satisfaction?
>>
>> Unfortunately with Range my understanding is that in a situation
>> where we have several "parties"/"groupings", some of which vote
>> strategically and some not, Range is too rewarding to the strategic
>> groupings.
>
> Note that "rewarding strategic groupings" is not the same as  
> "harming the public." Elections are not a zero-sum game.
>
> "Too" rewarding is a quantitative judgement. What is "too rewarding"?

The problem of being too rewarding may become obvious to people e.g.  
if after ten elections where Democrats have voted strategically  
(D=100, R=0) and Republicans have voted sincerely (R=90, D=80) (I  
assume that voters were requested to mark their utility values in the  
ballots) Democrats have won every election despite of receiving only  
a clear minority of votes.

>
> This argument has been presented many times against Range, and I  
> have never seen an analysis of what "too rewarding" is. Obviously,  
> something is missing, there are assumptions being made that, for  
> example, there should be no reward for strategic voting.
>
> Yet every method, to some degree, rewards strategic voting, and the  
> reward can be large. What is "too rewarding?"

If e.g. strategic voting is often possible, easy to apply, influences  
the results and maybe elects some clearly "no-good" candidates.

>
> Until that question is asked and answered, this argument is  
> essentially meaningless, an opinion without foundation, and quite  
> likely based on a moralistic judgement about strategic voting. But  
> strategic voting in Range is unlike strategic voting in ranked  
> methods. The latter require preference reversals, which are  
> tantamount to lies. Strategic voting in Range merely requires  
> truncation, which is not lying.

I think this is quite straight forward. If the method fails under  
strategic conditions or becomes something else than originally  
intended, then we may have a problem.

>
> By being familiar with "strategic voting" in ranked methods, and  
> disapproving of it because of the essential deception (which is an  
> error, a vote is not testimony, it's an action), this disapproval  
> gets transferred to Range by using the same terminology. Unfairly,  
> in fact.
>
> Voters express preferences over some scale. They normalize this  
> scale to their own internal, non-normalized scale, we can presume.  
> For simplicity, we assume a linear transformation. They take a  
> piece of their internal scale and lay it over the range of votes  
> allowed.
>
> If they place the preferrred candidate at the top, and the least  
> preferred at the bottom, we call this a "normalized sincere vote."  
> A "fully sincere" vote is actually normalized also, but probably  
> only at one end, but voters could transfer their *entire* internal  
> scale to the election range, and probably would vote most  
> candidates, or all, somewhere in the middle.

In Range there are many possible ways to use the method. I think it  
should always be made clear if one asks the voters to mark their  
sincere utilities, normalized utilities or "fully extremized"  
opinions (with option to cast also weak votes as needed). The Range  
problems typically emerge when the voters use the scale in different  
ways (strategically or with "more sincere intentions"). For me the  
most sincere Range is one where I very seldom use the min and max  
values (since I think a typical politician is not the worst choice  
for the job nor the best).

>
> *It is up to them*.
>
> In any case, it is no more or less "sincere" in the ordinary  
> meaning *however* they match their internal scale to the range of  
> the election, provided they don't *distort*. And some kinds of  
> distortion would also be, in the ordinary meaning, "sincere." (this  
> would mean stretching or compressing part of the internal scale  
> while laying it down.) Only reversal of preference is actually  
> "insincere."
>
> And if they place their favorite, for example, above the scale of  
> the range election (or, thinking of it the other way, they lay the  
> range scale over their internal scale, placing the max rating on it  
> below the favorite, it then becomes possible for them to max rate  
> others, "sincerely."
>
> It is a very serious error to term Approval-style voting in Range  
> as "insincere." There is no basis for it other than a convention,  
> and such conventions are dangerous, where they create special  
> terminology, accepted in a specialized field, with implications  
> quite different from general usage. We get to use big words in  
> special fields, and we can even coin terms.

Depends on how the voters were expected to vote.

>
> So Warren Smith is right. There are different kinds of strategy,  
> and Range never encourages reversal, therefore it never encourages  
> what is, in general usage, "insincere voting." And what I've  
> mentioned elsewhere about missing candidates, write-ins where the  
> voter indicates true preference, is possible in Range without harm,  
> or with harm so small as to be negligible, it depends on the  
> details. (In Range 2, for example, if the voter voted 2 for a write- 
> in, and then wanted to maintain preference and so voted 1 max for  
> other candidates, it would be harmful to this voter's  
> participation. But the voter in Range 2 would simply vote 2 for the  
> running candidate and 2 for the write-in. It's pretty obvious from  
> that vote that the voter prefers the write-in! The voter would not  
> bother if there was actual equality! And I would treat it this way  
> in preference analysis.)
>
>> > I don't find the answers to these questions obvious. Apparently
>> > some do.
>>
>> I think the main rules for Range are quite straight forward. There
>> are some special cases that raise interesting second thoughts, but as
>> a main rule I'd say that if some "bigger than marginal" group of
>> voters is strategic, then Range tends to become "Approval with option
>> to cast weakened votes".
>
> Which is not harmful. Indeed, my studies show, so far -- all the  
> details have not been nailed down -- that converting a Range 2  
> election to Approval harms *all* voters, that is, it reduces their  
> expected outcome.
>
> Range *is* "Approval with option to cast weakened votes," it does  
> not become it. And it turns out that those who cast weakened votes,  
> even if only a few (so few, indeed, that one voter can accomplish  
> it), *help* not only the strategic voter, but also the sincere ones.

What I mean by "becoming" is that majority of the voters come to the  
conclusion that they will use min and max values and forget the mid  
values (assuming that they were originally expected/requested to use  
also other than min and max values).

>
> By making the election into actual Approval, quite as we would  
> expect from the simulations, society overall is harmed. So,  
> consider this as a proposal:
>
> there is some benefit to strategic voters under Approval, under  
> some scenarios, however, by denying them this benefit by making the  
> election Approval, we are preventing them from gaining this  
> benefit, *but nobody is gaining.*
>
> So we are essentially *punishing" strategic voting by forcing  
> everyone else to vote strategically. I.e., you *will* vote the  
> extremes, because we are not going to give you any other option,  
> because if we do, somebody might benefit and that would be BAD.
>
> Please explain it to me, why we should consider strategic votes as  
> something to prevent. They are a medicine that voters use when they  
> are sick, when society is sick.

Strategic votes themselves are maybe not a problem if they are just  
noise in the election, but if the strategists are able to change the  
outcome of the election to something else than the society wants it  
to be, that'd be a problem.

>
> I have above argued that Approval style voting is not insincere. It  
> merely represents a different overlay position and "stretch"  
> between the internal utilities and the Range Votes than one which  
> fixes the endpoints at the max an min candidate positions. We vote  
> that way when we do not trust the rest of the electorate to vote  
> sincerely. This is a *sickeness*.
>
> (Either ours, or the electorate's or both.)
>
> We know that if everyone votes sincerely, that society overall does  
> better. It's true, absolutely true, that our own utility may not be  
> maximized. But the method is such that our utility will *almost* be  
> maximized. And it is entirely possible, even likely if we assume  
> that the other votes are sincere, or at least usually sincere, that  
> the benefit to others really does outweigh my own relatively small  
> loss.
>
> And routinely, we make decisions that are based on this.
>
> And it comes back to us. If every election maximizes social  
> benefit, overall, then while I might lose a little in some  
> elections, I'm quite likely to gain *more* in other elections. Over  
> a large series of elections, I gain more than I lose.
>
> Essentially, trying to maximize my personal gain in a Range  
> election by voting Approval style is short-sighted. If everyone  
> does it, everyone loses, on average.

Note that the "on average" addition is critical. If the strategists  
will benefit, that's a good enough reason for them to vote  
strategically. Maybe the society lost but they got more. And  
typically they think this is the way to go since they expect also  
others to vote strategically (which would again balance the  
situation, but the voting style has now changed).

>
> These objections to approval are themselves short-sighted, for  
> essential elements are missing from the argument. How much is "too  
> much reward." Quantify it and show how it can be expected to happen  
> in real elections, and it might be worth looking at.

I refer to my earlier (extreme, sorry) example on Democrats and  
Republicans.

>
> Otherwise it is simply shallow, knee-jerk thinking. Quite common,  
> so Juho will find plenty of people to agree with him.
>
>> In my terms you are interested also in elections that non-
>> competitive. That's good. Let's just make it clear when we talk about
>> competitive and when about non-competitive or less competitive cases
>> => Assumptions to be stated. (Term "we want" is just passive "one
>> wants".)
>
> The default is no assumption, so the logic and conclusions should  
> reflect the general case. All elections. Then we, for example,  
> specify "large," to mean that effects that appear when the number  
> of voters is sufficiently small are neglected. It's not clear what  
> it means to specify "competitive."
>
> How does this affect conformance with election criteria, such as  
> the standard ones or the Range or Approval criteria?

If Range is presented to voters as "vote min or max, or a weak  
intermediate vote if you like" then voting in Approval style is no  
problem. If Range is presented as "mark your sincere preferences,  
e.g. R=90, D=80" then Approval style voting should be considered  
strategical and those voters that voted as requested may feel  
themselves betrayed.

>
> It affects, as far as I can see, the incidence of what is being  
> called, a bit deceptively, strategic voting.
>
> But that is not clearly defined, because, for reasons I've  
> explained elsewhere, the internal normalized utilities for  
> candidates might be 950, but the voter votes 900 because 0 is  
> really bad, 5 is so bad that the voter does not want to participate  
> in the election of the 5. This isn't strategic, it is "sincere."  
> And we can't tell the difference between this and a strategic vote.
>
> Votes are actions, and they have effects. Election methods give  
> voters certain power, and generally, when you have power,  
> flexibility in exercising it is to be preferred. Range N is like  
> giving every voter N votes to cast in an Approval election, it is  
> like creating, from the voter, N voters, who are going to act as a  
> cooperative community, since they are really one person with one  
> common interest. And communities can divide labor or actions.
>
> I say let each community decide how to vote. If they all act  
> together, sure, they have more power, but that power has been  
> artificially unified. Fine distinctions are lost, and the result is  
> loss of intelligence. It's obvious from general principles.
>
> A sane society would never prefer ranked methods to rating methods,  
> once they understood the latter. This doesn't mean that they would  
> abandon majority rule, the conflict is illusory and I greatly  
> prefer that the method make majority consent explicit. No candidate  
> should be elected without majority consent, ever.
>
> If it is an emergency, and the office *must* be filled, then the  
> majority can affirm that, quickly, thus choosing the outcome of  
> some method quickly.
>
> Many arguments about election methods are really arguments about  
> democracy. Much more than we realize, many people are against  
> democracy, they do not trust it. Old ideas die *very* hard.
>
>> > Approval is a constricted Range method.
>> >
>> > Lost in all this is the fact that the general consensus among Range
>> > advocates is that Approval is an excellent first step. It's cheap,
>> > it's simple, it's easy to understand. And it *is* Range, just the
>> > maximally constricted version.
>>
>> First step to what?
>
> Election reform.
>
>>  I that would be e.g. the U.S. election reform,
>> then the second step might be difficult since it may require that the
>> competitive elections first evolve into more non-competitive (to make
>> Range really useful). I'm not very optimistic, I think the U.S.
>> elections are currently quite competitive.
>
> But the first step is to Approval, which works well in a  
> competitive environment, there are no intermediate ratings, the  
> point of the argument.
>
> And then the next steps do make a choice, do we go toward ranked  
> methods or toward sum of ratings methods? Lost in the discussion is  
> sometimes the fact that Approval is also a ranked method, with two  
> ranks. Given this, it is Condorcet-compliant. (However, the  
> Condorcet Criterion is usually interpreted as applying to  
> unexpressed preferences that it is presumed the voter would express  
> if the method allowed it.)
>
> And there could be a lot of debate over that. However, the Approval  
> first step does set one precendent that would probably persevere.  
> If we were to go to IRV, equal ranking would be allowed. Thus you'd  
> have another option to reversing rank, making it possible to vote  
> sincerely in IRV more often without harm. If I'm correct, this  
> would improve IRV, cutting way back on the center squeeze effect.  
> It also improves Condorcet methods, in general, to have equal  
> ranking allowed, and results, probably, in fewer spoiled ballots.
>
> General principle: allow the voters to use the ballot they are  
> provided. Restricting what they can do, generally, harms democracy.  
> Forcing them to make choices they don't want to make can be  
> predicted to be harmful.
>
>> I have mentioned this before. One could go in the direction of making
>> Range Condorcet compliant (use it as a Condorcet completion method).
>> Or alternatively one can be happy with the fact that in non-
>> competitive elections/polls Range can pick better candidates (sum of
>> utilities point of view) than Condorcet would pick.
>
> *Even if the method is Condorcet* using a Range ballot to collect  
> the information is far more useful, and it allows the study of  
> election performance. Conversely, if we have a Condorcet ballot  
> with as many ranks as there are candidates, and there are N  
> candidates, the election becomes analyzable as Range N if the  
> voters use it that way, collapsing some ranks to equal vote and  
> leaving others empty.
>
> And this may actually be optimal Condorcet strategy, I'm not sure.
>
> The real question, to which Juho seems to be assuming an answer  
> without presenting evidence, is that in *competitive* elections  
> Range does not choose a better winner.
>
> Range *is* Approval, that is, Approval behavior is allowed in  
> Range, and contributes to the performance of the method. It is true  
> that voting Approval style harms the overall utility maximization,  
> but changing the election from Range to Approval simply  
> *guarantees* that loss!
>
> Range with almost all strategic voting is obviously not worse than  
> Approval. It looks like, actually, it is still better, it only  
> takes a single voter voting intermediate ratings (or three if we  
> assume that these voters normalize) to improve the utility  
> expectations over Approval. Isn't that an interesting discovery?

Range with 100% of voters using Approval strategy gives same results  
as Approval. Range with some voters voting in Approval style gives  
more power to the Approval style voters. Range with one opinion group  
voting more in Approval style than other groups favours that  
political group.

A general comment. The main problem in these discussions seems to be  
the problem of mixing Approval style, normalized votes and fully  
utility based votes in Range. Different groups have different power.  
The dynamics of the system may drive it towards Approval style  
voting, not towards more sincere utility oriented voting.

Juho

>


		
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