[EM] Intermediate RV rating is never optimal
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sat Jul 21 22:09:13 PDT 2007
bits and pieces
At 05:33 AM 7/21/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>That's incorrect. It's exactly the same in RV as in Approval. In
>your example, with B at your Approval cutoff, it doesn't matter how you rate B.
In what I wrote, B was not at the voters "approval cutoff." I didn't
give an approval cutoff. Approval cutoff is an artificial insertion;
it's a device for converting range ratings to approval votes.
This is the situation described:
The voter prefers A>B>C, with the preference strength between A and B
being the same as the strength between B and C.
There is nothing here about Approval cutoff, there is nothing that
says that the voter does or does not "approve" of *any* candidate.
Ossipoff confused the fact that the candidate was intermediate
between A and C in sincere rating, i.e., being midrange, with being
"at your Approval cutoff." And, quite clearly, it *does* matter how
you rate B in some scenarios; for example, if the real pairwise
election is between A and B, then the optimum vote is to rate B at
minimum. And if it is between B and C, then the optimum vote is to
rate B at maximum.
But what if we have, instead, some spread of probabilities of
election of the various candidates? What if all three candidates are
equally likely? I've proposed, in another thread, a test of this
latter scenario.
This has practically nothing to do with "approval cutoff."
In the end, the voter casts a vote. The vote is counted in a certain
way. It's an action, it has an effect. If a voter casts a
full-strength vote for a candidate, we could term that Approval,
though it may not be anything more than a lesser of two evils choice,
and it's quite possible that the voter would prefer the office be left vacant.
If the voter casts no vote for a candidate, it may actually be true
that the voter "approves" of the candidate, i.e., the candidate is
above some "approval cutoff," but in the context -- say there are
only two candidates in the election and this one is not the favorite
-- it would not be optimal to vote for the candidate.
For "Approval cutoff" to make any sense, in what Ossipoff wrote, we
have to define Approval cutoff in quite a complex way, which
integrates both the utilities of the candidates and the election probabilities.
And if this is a Range election, whether or not the candidate is at
the approval cutoff or above it or below it, by itself, tells us
nothing about the optimum vote.
"Approval cutoff" is usually used to imply some kind of rating level,
above which we will Approve the candidate. Yet it is quite clear that
the optimal rating for a candidate is not dependent upon being above
or below a certain specific rating level, but depends not only on
rating but on election probability as well. Our optimal vote is not
just a matter of fixing an approval level and determining if the
candidate is above that or below it.
The reason "approval cutoff" seems to make some sense is that if we
rate one candidate higher than another whom we have decided to
approve, we should likewise approve of the higher one. So it is as if
there is an approval rating level somewhere between the ratings of
the candidates we are approving and those we are not, and, we *could*
use some device to indicate approval on a Range ballot. For example,
a dummy candidate, the rating for which sets an approval cutoff.
How would this be used? Well, it would be used to determine if a
majority "approved" of the Range winner. If not, then we would not
have in indication of majority support for that winner, and the
election would require a runoff or would simply fail. Basically, a
majority of voters would have voted No on the election of the Range winner.
If you want to avoid having to come in and vote again, then set your
approval cutoff in a sincere way! Consider how you would vote if the
only question were "Shall this candidate be elected?" If you'd vote
Yes, then approve the candidate -- with the cutoff. That isn't going
to determine the winner, in itself. It's just going to decide whether
or not there needs to be some further process.
It's my strong opinion that, like any democratic decision, the
majority should explicitly accept the winner of an election. This is
actually standard process in many small organizations, it takes a
majority vote to finalize an election. (And, even where it is routine
to simply announce the election result, officers can be removed by
majority vote at any time, so that the majority allows an officer to
continue is tacit approval. When there is a fixed term, it's more complicated.)
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