[EM] When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers

[Juho]

- Some Condorcet methods (e.g. Minmax(margins)) elect Condorcet  
Losers with sincere votes. In some extreme situations the Condorcet  
Loser may be the best candidate.

- Note also that the Condorcet specific problems do not do not  
materialize in most elections. I haven't yet seen any good examples  
where some large scale public elections where voters make independent  
decisions on how to vote would tend to fail.

Juho


On Jul 16, 2007, at 7:32 , ws at cs.brown.edu wrote:

> I've written a short paper that I think you may find interesting.  
> It's still
> somewhat drafty, but it's good enough to share.
>
> Here's the abstract:
>
> We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely  
> related to honest
> Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear
> font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear  
> Condorcet
> Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show that  
> Condorcet
> methods can elect a Condorcet Loser with non-zero probability when  
> voters vote
> tactically. With strategic agents, approval voting is better at  
> electing
> Condorcet Winners than Condorcet methods!
>
> Paper is available at http://www.cs.brown.edu/~ws/approval.pdf .  
> Please
> send comments and/or questions my way.
>
> thanks,
> ws
>
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