[Election-Methods] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 37, Issue 47

[ws at cs.brown.edu]

Quoting election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com:
> Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2007 14:17:29 -0400
> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>
> Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] [EM] RV comments

> By limiting ourselves to "competitive elections," we are limiting
> ourselves, actually, to dysfunctional societies. We need to know that.
>
> And there is a conclusion we can make. If we care about improving the
> function of society, we should worry that an election method that
> works beautifully in a dysfunctional society might actually inhibit a
> return to function. If the election method encourages polarization
> and competition, it may prevent the society from healing.

Nice point, but I'm afraid that moving society to be functional is too much to
hope for.

Selfishness leading to socially suboptimal results is pervasive. The famous
"tragedy of the commons" happens at all scales, from village commons to fishing
stocks to global warming. Anecdotally, small communities seem to often keep
selfishness under control, but big communities have a much harder time at it.
Does anyone know of any societies of more than a million people that are
functional in this sense?

> Essentially, trying to maximize my personal gain in a Range election
> by voting Approval style is short-sighted. If everyone does it,
> everyone loses, on average.

I agree with that statement.

If a *random* subset of voters choose to vote strategically, I agree that range
is better than approval. What scares me about range is what happens if there's
a correlation between what people's opinions about the candidates and their
sincerity. What happens if functional and cooperative people vote sincerely
while dysfunctional and selfish people vote strategically? The result would be
society run by the most competitive people! I see several problems with this:

1) I think that if we had a choice we'd give extra power to cooperative people
and less power to selfish people. But range does the opposite, giving less
power to the people who have society's long-term interests at heart!

2) Suppose the country is polarized about some issue and one side does a better
job of convincing its voters to vote strategically and therefore wins. The other
side will naturally be tempted to do more polarizing rhetoric next time, thereby
encouraging more strategic votes. So I think that by forcing people to *act* in
a polarized fashion (approval), you ironically reduce the need for polarizing
rhetoric!

Summary: I believe it's better to force everyone to vote strategically
(approval) than to give power to the candidate whose supporters have the most
black and white, polarized view of the world.

----

General comment to everyone: remember that it is possible to conduct a poll
using a method that is different from the one used on election day. So a range
or Condorcet method can be used in a poll to guide approval towards a good
equilibrium.




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