[Election-Methods] Intermediate rating is never optimal
Michael Ossipoff
mikeo2106 at msn.com
Thu Jul 26 04:03:08 PDT 2007
I'm replying to this Lomax posting only because I received a copy of it in
individual e-mail from another list-member.
Lomax says:
At 05:33 AM 7/21/2007, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
That's incorrect. It's exactly the same in RV as in Approval. In
your example, with B at your Approval cutoff, it doesn't matter how you rate
B.
Lomax replies:
In what I wrote, B was not at the voters "approval cutoff."
I reply:
Wrong. You said that the voter had no information about whom the pair-tie
would be between if there were one. That's what is called a zero-information
election. In such an election, for the expectation-maximizing voter, one's
Approval cutoff is at the mean of all the candidates. In your example, B is
at that mean. In your example, B is exactly at the Approval cutoff.
And, as I said, that's why it doesn't matter how the voter rates B.
Lomax continues:
This is the situation described:
The voter prefers A>B>C, with the preference strength between A and B
being the same as the strength between B and C.
I reply:
No, that's not the situation described. You also said that the voter had no
information about who would be in the pair-tie if there were one.
Lomax continues:
There is nothing here about Approval cutoff, there is nothing that
says that the voter does or does not "approve" of *any* candidate.
I reply:
As I said, for the voter maximizing hir expectation, in a 0-info election
such as you describe, the strategy is to vote for the above-mean candidates.
In your example, B is at the mean, and so B is exactly at the Approval
cutoff for the expectation-maximizing voter.
Lomax continues:
Ossipoff confused the fact that the candidate was intermediate
between A and C in sincere rating, i.e., being midrange, with being
"at your Approval cutoff."
I reply:
In the 0-info situation that you described, for the expectation-maximizing
voter, that mean position is indeed the Approval cutoff.
Lomax continues:
And, quite clearly, it *does* matter how
you rate B in some scenarios
I reply:
...but not in your scenario. It should be obvious that I was referring to
your example. Because I said so.
Please, don't anyone send me copies of Lomax's postings, because I don't
want to read his rebuttals, because I don't intend to answer them, for the
reasons that I've given.
But Chris's reply to this Lomax posting was well-expressed, and my own reply
mostly just repeats Chris's answers.
Mike Ossipoff
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list