[EM] Why does IRV but not delayed top-two runoff lead to 2-party domination?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 06:17 AM 2/23/2007, Jan Kok wrote:
>2. Under IRV, if a "third party" candidate makes it to the last round,
>it draws little attention from the media. But under TTR, when there is
>a runoff, both candidates get equal attention for several weeks. This
>lets the finalists compete on an equal basis, so the third party has a
>realistic chance to win, and even if hse does not win, the party and
>candidate will be remembered in the next election.

Whether or not this is *the* explanation, it is thoroughly plausible 
that this has an effect. Quite simply, a real runoff election is a 
different animal than what happens in IRV, because of the campaigning 
and public attention which is now focused on two candidates. It is 
*far* easier, I'd expect, for a third party to make it to the top 
two, where it *is* going to get major attention and just might win, 
than to win under plurality, for sure, and with IRV, it won't get the 
opportunity. Even if ballot analysis shows that the third party was 
close, it is just not the same as a public contest.

I've never been thrilled about "instant* runoff; readers may have 
noticed that I prefer whatever takes elections into something closer 
to deliberative process, and succeeding votes with debate between 
them is definitly moving toward deliberation. The ultimate of this 
would be pairwise, where each question presented to the public is a 
Yes/No question, and which will pick *at worst* the Condorcet winner 
(if the Condorcet winner is presented at some point in the process). 
But, of course, this process is impractical for public elections.

Or is it? It actually becomes possible with Asset Voting or with 
Delegable Proxy, for these techniques can boil down the electorate 
into a representative body that can function fully deliberatively. 
And those who are familiar with the FA/DP proposals will know that 
such a body can allow direct voting on questions before it. That is, 
any voter could participate in the voting at any point, or may 
entrust this right to a proxy, who may further pass it on, all of 
which transmission is rendered moot whenever the voter votes directly.

The traditional understanding that direct democracy is impractical is 
based on an assumption that links voting with other forms of 
participation. It is impossible to *deliberate* in large groups, not 
in the traditional way, because demands for floor time become 
impossible to fulfill. There are ways around this, but the DP method 
solves the most basic problem: even if we find a way to deliberate in 
large groups (such as creating a hierarchy of subgroups), most people 
don't have the time.

FA/DP preserves the right of direct vote, but does not guarantee the 
right to deliberate, i.e., to address the general assembly and to 
enter motions. That right may be reserved for privileged proxies (DP) 
or elected representatives (Asset). The right to vote does not add 
deliberative burden, so there is no reason to restrict it to 
representatives only.

(The argument that the public is insufficiently informed is an old 
antidemocratic argument that is specious. Some of the public is 
informed, some is not. Ultimately, who has the right to decide that a 
particular individual is sufficiently informed or not? Remember, 
elected representatives, currently, are sometimes very badly 
informed..... My answer is that in a democracy, the one who has this 
right is the voter himself or herself. *I* decide if I know enough 
about a subject to vote on a matter that requires this knowledge. 
And, the fact is, I don't know enough about *most* subjects to make 
me want to vote on it if I have the option of leaving the matter to 
someone I trust to know better than I (or at least as well as I).

If ignorant people want to vote on things they don't understand, 
well, it's a democracy. They have the right. Democracy allows people 
to make foolish decisions. If a *majority* makes a foolish decision, 
society is going to suffer. The alternative is to repress that 
foolish majority, and a society which does this is in trouble in any case.