[EM] Dave reply. ARLO and power-truncation.

[Dave Ketchum]

I agree with much, but differ as to truncation

Given acceptable candidates A and B, plus equally unacceptable rejects C 
and D:

If A and B are equally acceptable:
      Approval can say this.
      Also Condorcet:  A=B  - which gets remembered as A=B, A>C, A>D, B>C, 
B>D.

There can be debate as to remembering A=B.  For each 2 such votes I would 
count as if there was 1 each of A>B and B>A.

If I PREFERRED A, I Need Condorcet to say so:
      A>B - which gets remembered as A>B, A>C, A>D, B>C, B>D.

All the above assumes normal truncation permitted.  Truncation variations:

      Prohibited:  Flip a coin and add >C>D or >C<D or >C=D - which 
affects C vs D, but not the fact that I prefer A or B.
      Power truncation:  As I read Michael's words, it would get 
remembered as C>D and D>C - does not look useful.
      ARLO?  Seems complicated beyond believable value, so I am tempted to 
attack.  Think of an election for governor.  Why should we not expect some 
Republicans to place all non-Republicans below the line, and some 
Democrats to respond in kind?

DWK

On Sun, 18 Feb 2007 12:57:02 +0000 Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> 
> First, I want to express my agreement with the statement that we’re here 
> because public elections are important. We’re not here because of campus 
> elections or organizational elections, etc. I suggest that campus 
> governments and organizations be urged to use methods that are suitable 
> for, and proposable for, public elections. To help get precedent, public 
> experience and public exposure for better public voting systems.
> 
> Dave wrote:
> 
> While we can learn by participating in polls, we need to remember that 
> our proper goal is assisting average voters in elections.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Yes, and that’s all the more reason why we should have experience 
> regarding what it’s like to use what we’re selling. Polls are the only 
> way to get that experience.
> 
> Dave continued:
> 
> Perhaps we need to debate need for ranking all the candidates with 
> Condorcet.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I probably wouldn’t rank them all. In fact I’d power-truncate most of 
> them if power-truncation were available. (I’ll define power-truncation 
> later in this posting).
> 
> Dave continued:
> 
> There is no such need, and demanding more ranking than might be useful 
> can even end up with false ranking if voters are forced to pretend to 
> decide value of candidates that do not interest them positively.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Faced with a ballot with 20 rank positions could discourage someone from 
> voting. In one of our presidential polls, the nominations got sillier 
> and sillier, till we had about 46 candidates. Only 7 people voted. 
> Ranking all the candidates, as I did, was a bit of work. Rating them all 
> was _a lot_ of work. Approval voting, however, was easy.
> 
> Dave continued:
> 
> Those voters who find they can fully express their desires in a race 
> with Approval, should be allowed to express EXACTLY the same desires 
> with Condorcet with the same effort.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Quite so. And that’s why I’ve proposed power-truncation and the ARLO 
> option. I’m not saying that Condorcet _needs_ them, but they’d reassure 
> people who worry about strategy. And they’d please the principled voter 
> who wants to show his opinion of his less-liked candidates. I’ll define 
> them either at the end of this posting, or in a subsequent one later 
> tonight or tomorrow morning when I next get a chance to get on the computer.
> 
> For me as a voter (as opposed to what I believe that others need) 
> Approval would be fine. It’s other voters who, I feel, need Condorcet. I 
> admit that that’s my subjective opinion, because other progressives 
> disagree with me about what is acceptable and approvable.
> 
> 
> I’d said:
> 
> 
> Yes, I’d rather have SSD, but if it’s to be a handcount, or there are 
> lots of candidates, and you might not want to ask people to rank that 
> many candidates, then the much easier Approval offers a very good 
> substitute for Condorcet’s expressiveness, Approval’s own kind of 
> expressiveness. Approval would be my 2nd choice then.
> 
> 
> 
> Dave replies:
> 
> To me, depends on what kind of expressiveness I wish for in a particular 
> race
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Well, one thing I’d enjoy about Approval would be showing my disgust for 
> candidates by not voting for them. Likewise, for the same reason, I’d 
> enjoy using power-truncation and ARLO, even though it’s very unlikely 
> that they’d actually be needed in Condorcet.
> 
> About education: Polls in public places, such as outdoor fairs, or on 
> the Internet, or use of better voting systems in campus elections and 
> organizations would be good ways to show people how interesting and 
> useful better voting systems are.
> 
> A few definitions:
> 
> Power truncation (PT):
> 
> If you indicate that you want to power truncate everyone below a certain 
> rank position (In an EM poll, you’d do that by writing “PT” above those 
> rank positions), then your ballot casts a pair-wise vote for every one 
> of the other candidates (whether power-truncated or not) over every 
> power truncated candidate. So, for example, say there are 20 candidates, 
> and you power-truncate 15 of them. For each one of those 15 
> power-truncated candidates, your ballot casts a pair-wise vote for each 
> of the other 19 candidates over that candidate.
> 
> In general, no matter what the rank method, your ballot would treat each 
> power truncated candidate as if you’d ranked every one of the other 
> candidates over him/her.
> 
> ARLO (Automatic Rank Line Option):
> 
> ARLO uses up to 3 counts.
> 
> If you indicate that you want to use ARLO at a certain point in your 
> ranking (In an EM poll you’d do that by writing ARLO at that point in 
> the ranking), then your ballot truncates (power truncates, if power 
> truncation is allowed--and it should be allowed) every candidate below 
> ARLO. The candidates above ARLO are left in the order in which you 
> ranked them.
> 
> If, in the 1st count, a candidate below at least one voter’s  ARLO line 
> wins, then there will be a 2nd count.
> 
> If, in the 2nd count, a candidate below at least one voter’s ARLO line 
> wins, there will be a 3rd count.
> 
> If a below-line candidate wins at least one of the first two counts, 
> then your ballot promotes all the above-line candidates to equal 1st 
> place, and they stay there.
> 
> If there’s a 2nd count, and it is won by  a below-line candidate, then 
> your ballot un-truncates the below line candidates, and they’re treated 
> as any ranking would treat them, according to where you have them 
> ranked. In other words, they’re restored to where you’ve ranked them, 
> instead of being truncated or power-truncated.
> 
> An example of a ballot with ARLO:
> 
> 1. Ralph Nader
> 2. Peter Camejo
> ARLO
> 3. Dennis Kucinich
> 4. Barak Obama
> 5. Hillary Clinton
> 6. John McCain
> 
> If you don’t want to restore the below-ARLO candidates in the event that 
> a below-ARLO candidate wins, then that can be achieved by 
> unconditionally power-truncating the below-ARLO candidates. Obviously 
> then there’s no need to rank them:
> 
> 1. Ralph Nader
> 2. Peter Camejo
> ARLO
> PT
> 
> But maybe you’d like to unconditionally power-truncate some, but not 
> all, of the below ARLO candidates. That too can be easily done by how 
> you place PT:
> 
> 1. Ralph Nader
> 2. Peter Camejo
> ARLO
> 3. Dennis Kucinich
> PT
> Of course you could rank the below-PT candidates if you wanted to, but 
> there’s no reason to.
> 
> You don’t want a Republocrat, but if it appears that one is going to 
> win, then you want to try to make it Kucinich.
> 
> I re-emphasize that it would be very unlikely for power truncation or 
> ARLO to actually be needed in an SSD, CSSD or BeatpathWinner election. 
> But it’s a way to make a statement,
> 
> Oh now look what I’ve gone and done! I’ve revealed how I’d vote in a 
> Condorcet election between those candidates, if ARLO and PT are 
> available, and how I’d vote in an EM presidential poll with those 
> candidates. There goes the element of surprise. But you haven’t voted 
> yet, so there’s still a reason to conduct an EM presidential poll.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
-- 
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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