[EM] RE : Randomized MCA, new weird voting method idea

[Kevin Venzke]

Warren,

--- Warren Smith <wds at math.temple.edu> a écrit :
> The point is: if X were some fixed known constant (conventional MCA
> method: X=50%), then with a huge number of voters,
> it would be virtually certain the election would end in the 1st round,
> or virtually certain it would end in the 2nd round. The voters
> would get wise to which. Once they knew which round it was going to be,
> then the election would really just be an approval-voting election,
> and any advantages of the 3-slot over regular 2-slot voting, would
> essentially not exist.

I agree with your conclusion, that 3-slot median rating would not see much
advantage over Approval. I don't think I understand your reasoning though.

I don't think the value of X is especially useful information to the
strategic voter. I can see a value of 50% as possibly useful if the
electorate is expected to be split down the middle on two frontrunners.
I don't see how any other value would be useful at all.

> MCA turns out (according to IEVS simulations) to be one of the best
> voting methods, and this one might be better.
> Well, in fact, with the optimum probability distribution for X
> (whatever that might mean - which I'm not sure) it *must* be better?

This must surely depend on how you alter voter behavior to respond to
this variation...

Kevin Venzke


	

	
		
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