[EM] Dave reply, Feb. 19, 0831 GMT

[Michael Ossipoff]

Dave said:

There can be debate as to remembering A=B. For each 2 such votes I would 
count as if there was 1 each of A>B and B>A.

I reply:

A>B and B>A would make sense if you’d power truncated A and B. But saying 
that they’re equal is not the same as saying that each is better than the 
other.

Dave continues:

Power truncation: As I read Michael's words, it would get remembered as C>D 
and D>C - does not look useful.

I reply:

With N candidates in the election, for each candidate that you 
power-truncate, your ballot casts a pair-wise vote for each of the N-1 other 
candidates over him/her. Useful? It’s extremely useful, because it lets you 
give the worst vote-against that could be given, to as many candidates as 
you want to.

Dave continues:

ARLO? Seems complicated beyond believable value

I reply:

I certainly wouldn’t include ARLO or power truncation in a first Condorcet 
proposal. But if, later, there was concern about strategy, those options 
would be good solutions.

The value of ARLO, and power truncation, is tremendous, for the timid voter 
whose sincere ranking could otherwise be distorted by strategy concerns. 
ARLO and PT are better than the favorite-betrayal or unnecessary equal 
ranking, etc., that a strategy-timid voter might otherwise feel the need to 
do.

Condorcet has practically zero need for ARLO and PT. But they could reassure 
the strategy-fearful voter.

Dave continued:

Think of an election for governor. Why should we not expect some Republicans 
to place all non-Republicans below the line, and some Democrats to respond 
in kind?

I reply:

So? What’s wrong with that? It will make it easier for Nader to beat the 
Republicans <smiley>.  But, seriously, it has to be assumed that the voters 
know what they’re doing and will use the options in their own best interest.

Mike Ossipoff